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Abstract   
 
This thesis analyzes effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy mainly using the approach of 
New-Keynesian DSGE model which incorporates financial friction. Specifically, Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium model explicitly incorporating financial intermediaries like Gertler and Karadi 
(2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2013) are broadly utilized in the whole part of this thesis. Parameters 
are usually calibrated using Korean statistics and relevant literatures. Conceptually, in this thesis, 
enlarging monetary base through large scale asset purchase (LSAP) or foreign exchange intervention 
(FXI) is defined as typical monetary policy tool used in the implementation of unconventional 
monetary policy. Furthermore, the relationship between conventional and unconventional monetary 
policy is also examined in terms of the preferred habitat approach.    
 
In chapter 3, applying Gertler and Karadi (2011) typed New-Keynesian DSGE model into Korean 
economy, the effectiveness of credit policy is analyzed for the two types of financial shocks. The two 
types of financial shock are negative capital quality and negative bank net worth shock. Simulation 
results suggest that credit policy intervention contributes to moderate economic contraction, 
regardless of negative capital quality shock or bank net worth shock. In chapter 4, it proves that for 
emerging market economies including features of a small open economy, effectiveness of 
unconventional monetary policy like the intervention in domestic credit or in foreign exchange market 
can be very different according to the source of shock during the crisis. Regarding to negative global 
interest rate shock originated in external sector, it proves that the intervention in foreign exchange 
market can be more effective than the intervention in domestic credit market in moderating 
fluctuations of output and inflation. On the other hand, for negative capital quality or bank net worth 
shock originated in the domestic economy, it turns out that the intervention in domestic credit market 
is slightly better than the intervention in foreign exchange market in terms of policy effectiveness. In 
chapter 5, the effectiveness of two monetary policies such as traditional interest rate adjustment and 
the foreign exchange market intervention using foreign reserve are analyzed based on the model by 
Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016) which is the open economy version of Gertler and Karadi (2011). 
It seems that appropriate foreign exchange intervention using foreign reserve can be helpful in 
boosting inflation and output overall during the downturn. Simultaneously, it also proves that as the 
intensity of the intervention is stronger, as policy effectiveness is also bigger.  
 
In chapter 6, theoretical differences in policy effectiveness are analyzed in term of three perspectives 
applying Gertler and Karadi (2013) typed New-Keynesian DSGE model into Korean economy. 
According to policy simulations, it proves purchase of private securities can be more effective than 
purchase of long-term government securities when it comes to stabilizing financial market distress 
and boosting real activities. The result of policy experiment also demonstrates that asset purchase can 
be more effective when the zero lower bound constraint is maintained for some periods than when the 
nominal policy rate can be adjusted flexibly in reaction to an asset purchase shock. Finally, the policy 
effectiveness of an asset purchase can also become weaker when it is postulated that the household 
cannot directly hold any financial assets like long-term private securities and government securities. 
In chapter 7, the relationship between conventional and unconventional monetary policy is examined 
through the approach of “preferred habitat model” of Ellison and Tischbirek (2013) which includes 
characteristics of canonical New-Keynesian DSGE model. According to optimal monetary policy 
analysis, it proves that conventional monetary policy instrument like adjustment of short-term 
nominal policy rate can be harmoniously utilized as a complement with unconventional monetary 
policy like an asset purchase even though the policy rate is not restricted at zero lower bound. In 
addition, it also turns out that conducting conventional and unconventional monetary policy together 
can be considerably contributed to minimize the loss which is composed of the volatilities of short- or 
long-term government security interest rates.  
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In sum, considering all the comprehensive simulation results, such a conclusion can be derived that if 
Bank of Korea conducts unconventional monetary policy utilizing some policy instruments such as 
asset purchase or foreign exchange intervention, it would be able to considerably contribute to protect 
the collapse of abrupt financial intermediation in crisis and boost real activities in a deflationary 
environment. At the same time, it is also evident that according to the characteristic of each 
exogenous shock, proper unconventional monetary policy instrument under each specific economic 
situation can be largely different. Hence, in terms of this stance, Bank of Korea would have to be 
more careful in choosing the non-traditional monetary policy tool when they decide to conduct 
unconventional monetary policy actively in the future downturn. Furthermore, considering 
complementarity of conventional and unconventional monetary policy, it seems to be possible the 
Central Banks in emerging market economies are able to routinely use unconventional monetary 
policy instrument with traditional adjustment of short-term policy rate in normal time, not just in 
crisis, although policy rate is not restricted to zero lower bound.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Motivations and Objectives    
 
The distress in global financial markets triggered by bad subprime-mortgage claims in the U.S. was 
rapidly enlarged into the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in the late 2008 following the Lehmann 
Brothers disruption. Many Central Banks tried to counteract this unprecedented financial instability in 
the credit market and the deterioration of real activity by using traditional measures such as adjusting 
the nominal policy rate. However, as short-term nominal policy rates reached near the zero lower 
bound (ZLB), many Central Banks in advanced economies also started to implement unconventional 
measures1 including direct intervention in credit markets which is called quantitative easing. In 
addition, some Central Banks in advanced economies introduced a negative interest rate policy (NIRP) 
to invigorate the credit channel2.  
 
Around the same time, some Central Banks in emerging economies implemented rather different 
types of non-traditional monetary policies. In contrast to advanced economies, the main aim of such 
policies was to alleviate liquidity distresses in domestic credit or foreign exchange markets. 
Accordingly, those policy measures were different from those used by Central Banks in advanced 
economies, comprising an easing of domestic reserve requirements, liquidity injections into foreign 
exchange markets, currency swap arrangements between the Central Banks, and extending maturities 
on domestic lending.   
 
The effects of asset purchase policy are now discussed widely amongst academics and policy makers. 
Especially, as the policy rates have been maintained around the zero lower bound or effective lower 
bound in many countries since the Great Recession, discussions about optimal combination between 
existing interest rate policy and asset purchase policy are raised.   
 
In Korea, the policy rate of Bank of Korea is 1.25% as of January, 2020. As the policy rate of Bank of 
Korea approaches to effective lower bound, the necessity for Bank of Korea to conduct 
unconventional monetary policy in order to boost real activity is considerably raised recently, 




Therefore, against this backdrop, my thesis will focus on the following issues:  
 
 
First part:   
 
- How effective is unconventional monetary policy through credit market intervention in the 





1  Borio and Zabai (2016) classify unconventional monetary policy into Balance Sheet policy, Forward 
Guidance, and Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP). In addition, according to them, the Balance Sheet policy 
can be also sorted as Quasi-Debt Management Policy, Credit Policy, and Reserves Policy.           
2 The credit channel can be classified as bank lending and bank capital channel.    
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Second part:      
 
- How effective is unconventional monetary policy through foreign exchange market 
intervention in a small open emerging economy such as Korea?      
 
- How different are the effects of unconventional monetary policy through the intervention in the 
market of domestic credit or foreign exchange when considering Korea is a small open 
emerging economy?  
 
- How effective is foreign exchange market intervention using foreign reserves transmitted into 
real or financial sector when considering financial friction in the case of Korea?    
 
 
Third part:   
 
- How does policy effectiveness differ when the Central Bank purchases private securities or 
long-term government securities in Korea?           
 
- How effective is asset purchase policy when adjustment of the policy rate is restricted at the 
zero lower bound in Korea?     
 
- How different is policy effectiveness of asset purchase policy when household segmentation is 
considered, as in the case of Korea?     
 
 
Fourth part:   
 
- What is the optimal policy mix between conventional and unconventional monetary policy 
assuming the policy rate is above the zero lower bound in Korea?              
 
- What is the appropriate policy mix between short-term policy rate adjustment and asset 





- 11 - 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review of Unconventional Monetary Policy   
 
The following literature review consists of four parts. In the first part, literatures relating to canonical 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models including New-Keynesian features are 
reviewed. Second, New-Keynesian models incorporating financial frictions are surveyed, classifying 
models according to which sector of the economy is affected by the financial friction. Third, the 
literatures about effects of unconventional monetary policy are examined. Finally, such literatures 
about examining the effects of asset purchase policy through the approach of the “preferred habitat 
model” are reviewed.       
 
 
2.1 Canonical New-Keynesian Models      
 
Examples of canonical Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models incorporating New-
Keynesian characteristics such as price or wage stickiness include Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
(2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) include 
nominal rigidities when they set price and wage in their model, where these are modelled using a 
Calvo-type framework. They find that although price stickiness has a relatively limited effect, the 
rigidity of nominal wages plays a critical role, improving the performance of DSGE models 
significantly.       
 
Smets and Wouters (2007) build a middle-sized New-Keynesian DSGE model including stickiness of 
prices and wages. Their model includes a backward-looking element in nominal prices and wages by 
incorporating indexation to previous inflation rates, as well as fixed cost in production, external habit 
persistence in consumption, adjustment cost in investment, and variable capital utilization. 
Disturbances are modeled through seven structural shocks including risk premium, total factor 
productivity, and monetary policy shocks. With regard to forecasting performance, they find that their 
model performs as well as a Bayesian VAR model. They argue that in addition to investment 
adjustment costs both price and wage stickiness are crucial in lowering prediction errors in the model. 
However, the impact of factors such as an indexation is more limited for forecasting results.       
 
However, there are some limitations in that there is no role for the financial sector in either model. 
Hence, it seems that the implications of the financial sector for monetary policy effectiveness analysis 
are not recognized properly in most standard New-Keynesian DSGE models.      
 
 
2.2 Theoretical New-Keynesian Models with Financial Friction       
 
Approaches to incorporating financial frictions into DSGE models can be broadly classified into two 
types according to where such financial frictions originate in the model. The first type includes 
financial frictions on the non-financial borrowers such as the firm (or entrepreneur) or the household 
side in the model. On the other hand, the second type incorporates financial frictions on the financial 
intermediaries.  
 
First, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) include financial frictions 
through incorporating an agency problem between lenders and borrowers. Such models are based on a 
Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with two agents who are entrepreneurs and consumers. The agency 
problem between entrepreneurs and consumers creates a wedge between costs of internal and external 
financing. In the model, firms are constrained in their borrowing depending on their net worth. 
Studies like Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Degraeve (2008), and Christensen and Dib (2008) 
follow this approach.      
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Alternatively, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)’s approach is based on costly state verification (CSV) 
through establishing a collateral constraint on borrowing. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) build a model 
incorporating financial friction, similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999). Del 
Negro et al. (2013) also construct a New-Keynesian model which extends the canonical Smets and 
Wouters (2007) approach by incorporating Bernanke et al. (1999) type financial frictions on the firm 
side. They argue that their model can predict the rapid deterioration in real activity in the financial 
crisis of 2008. Furthermore, they also argue that if state dependent nominal rigidities are incorporated 
into the model, the persistent and modest decrease in inflation can be also matched.          
 
Second, in regard to incorporating financial frictions into the household side of the model, Iacoviello 
(2005) builds a model of the monetary business cycle including both nominal lending and collateral 
constraints. In his model, these constraints are closely related with value of housing. Through this 
mechanism, the impact of shocks is magnified and propagated over time. In this kind of model, the 
importance of house prices and debt indexation in implementing monetary policy is emphasized.        
 
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) expand the model of Iacoviello (2005) to a middle-sized New Keynesian 
model. They argue fluctuations in the housing market caused variability in consumption growth in 
1989-2006. Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2013) uncover asymmetric responses to the change of housing 
prices by extending the approach of Iacoviello and Neri (2010).       
 
In a second main approach, an agency problem is assumed between depositors and financial 
intermediaries in other research. In this type of model, the financial intermediary is constrained in the 
amount they can lend to non-financial firms depending on their net worth.  
 
For instance, Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) can be considered. To 
investigate the effects of balance sheet policy by the Federal Reserve since the Great Recession in 
2008, Gertler and Karadi (2011) design a model where asymmetric information is assumed between 
financial intermediaries and depositors. According to their model, changes in   financial 
intermediary’s capital or net worth can trigger impacts on borrowing and lending, which affect real 
activities such as investment and output.    
 
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) extend the model of Gertler and Karadi (2011) through incorporating an 
interbank financial market. In their model, heterogeneous banks are assumed and each bank 
experiences an idiosyncratic liquidity shock. Accordingly, in addition to the agency problem, the 
disruption of the interbank loan market can also affect real economic activity. Thus, appropriate 
intervention in the credit market by the Central Bank can dampen the negative influence of financial 
frictions during crises.   
 
There are also other approaches to introduce financial frictions into a cannonical New-Keynesian 
model relating to banking. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and Christiano et al. (2010) include a 
competitive banking sector with multiple financial assets having different returns into a canonical 
DSGE model. Furthermore, Aslam and Santoro (2008) and Gerali et al. (2010) develop a DSGE 
model that incorporates a banking sector which is monopolistically competitive.       
 
Curdia and Woodford (2011) develop a New-Keynesian model that includes financial intermediation. 
In their model, financial imperfection has a critical role as a wedge between lending and borrowing 
rates. This wedge can be generated by the use of resources in financial intermediation or through the 
market power of financial intermediaries. Angeloni and Faia (2013) develop a DSGE model that 
includes bank run. They analyze interactions with regulations on bank capital under the situation that 
banks are willing to increase their leverage and risk. Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014) also build a 
DSGE model including financial frictions for evaluating monetary policy design.   
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There is also a literature that analyses the effectiveness of unconventional policy from an emerging 
market perspective, including Ishi et al. (2009). They concentrate on the repercussions of different 
types of unconventional policy between advanced and emerging economies. By contrast with 
advanced economies, emerging economies had a tendency mainly to use foreign exchange 
intervention and domestic short-term liquidity easing instruments for counteracting the negative 
impacts of the Great Recession. They investigate the importance of unconventional policy in 
emerging economies is less than in advanced economies. This is mainly because of relatively limited 
financial stress, external vulnerabilities, and the limited scope for quasi-fiscal activities of emerging 
economies.  
 
In related work, Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki (2016) build a model in order to analyze the 
transmissions of shocks which occur in emerging economies. They make some macro-prudential 
policy recommendations.  
 
 
2.3 Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy from Empirical Perspective              
 
Since the Great Recession, a huge amount of research on examining the effectiveness of various 
unconventional monetary policy instruments has been conducted from an empirical perspective. A 
considerable amount of this research argues that unconventional monetary policy measures involving 
asset purchase programs carried out by some Central Banks in developed economies helped to reduce 
long-term yields in financial markets and to revive financial intermediation during the crisis.    
 
First, regarding the impacts of unconventional monetary policy by the Fed in the U.S. in the period of 
the Great Recession, Gagnon et al. (2011) argue asset purchases by FRB were helpful in lowering 
longer-term interest rates on securities even though some securities were not directly included in the 
formal large scale asset purchase program. They also argue that longer-term interest rates were 
lowered due to reduced risk and term premiums rather than through expectations of lower expected 
future interest rates. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) reach two conclusions based on an 
event-study methodology. First, they argue that concentrating on Treasury rates as a policy target of 
the asset purchase program is not optimal because the asset purchase program can work through 
various different channels causing different effects on different assets. Second, they also argue that 
the impact on particular assets can vary according to which types of assets are purchased. Bauer and 
Rudebusch (2012) find that large scale asset purchases by FRB provoked critical signaling effects 
which lowered expectation for future short-term interest rates. Meanwhile, using empirical dynamic 
term structure models, Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) find that U.S. Treasury yields were lowered 
mainly because of reduced policy expectations, while U.K. yields were lower mainly due to lower 
term premiums. With a model featuring risk-averse arbitrageurs, Hamilton and Wu (2011) find that 
historical Treasury factors are useful in predicting yields or excess returns in the period of 1990-2007.  
 
Some research is more skeptical about the effectiveness of the asset purchase by the FRB. For 
instance, Thornton (2012) is skeptical about the theoretical foundations of the portfolio balance 
channel in the asset purchase program and presents several arguments why the effectiveness of asset 
purchases might be limited. Kool and Thornton (2012) also find the effectiveness of an 
unconventional monetary policy instrument like forward guidance might be different according to the 
financial and economic conditions of each country conducting it. In particular, even though forward 
guidance was helpful in improving participants’ ability to forecast short-term rates in both Norway 
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Considering the Eurozone, Peersman (2011) investigates whether the strategy of monetary policy by 
the ECB for enlarging its balance sheet is different from conventional interest rate innovations. 
Through estimating a panel VAR for eight advanced economies with monthly data, Gambacorta et al. 
(2012) find that an exogenous enlargement in the Central Bank balance sheet is helpful for boosting 
economic activities and consumer prices under the zero lower bound.  
 
Next, considering the unconventional monetary measures conducted by the Bank of England (BOE) 
in the U.K., Meier (2009) argues that the asset purchases by the BOE were moderately successful. 
Joyce et al. (2011) also find that the quantitative easing by the BOE was helpful in lowering interest 
rates by around 80-90bp. Breedon, Chadha, and Waters (2012) find that the asset purchase program 
by the BOE lowered the yields of government bonds via the portfolio balance channel. They find that 
yields were lowered by around 50 to 100 bps.   
 
Finally, with regard to Japan’s experience of unconventional monetary policy, Ugai (2007) finds that 
the Quantitative Easing Policy (QEP) conducted by Bank of Japan (BOJ) through March 2001 to 
March 2006 had limited effects on boosting aggregate demand and prices owing to delayed 
adjustment in corporate balance sheet and the zero lower bound constraint. Ueda (2012) also finds 
unconventional monetary measures by BOJ were ineffective in stopping the Japanese deflationary 
trend although those measures had some impact on asset prices. Lam (2011)’s research also suggests 
consistent conclusions with the previous research. Using an event study, he finds while 
unconventional monetary accommodation by BOJ caused statistically considerable effects on 
reducing government bonds yields and boosting equity prices, it is also evident that there were no 
clear effects on expected inflations.     
 
 
2.4 Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy in Light of Preferred Habitat Model  
 
Vayanos and Vila (2009) develop the Modigliano and Sutch (1966) model. They claim that investors 
generally regard government bonds having different maturities as imperfect substitutes. From this 
perspective, they contend that investors are willing to pay some premium in order to purchase 
government bonds having the specific maturities they prefer.   
 
Chen et al. (2012) argue that the effectiveness of large scale asset purchase policy would be weaker 
without a commitment to maintain the nominal policy rate at the lower bound for a considerable time. 
Using a medium-scale DSGE model, they argue that combining non-traditional monetary policy like 
an asset purchase with a low policy rate stance can be more effective in terms of boosting inflation 
and output.    
 
Ellison and Tischbirek (2014) analyze effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy based on a 
preferred habitat assumption. According to their preferred habitat approach, because investors have 
preference for specific maturities of assets, short- and long- term government securities are regarded 
as imperfect substitutes. Therefore, they argue that an appropriate policy mix of conventional and 
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Chapter 3. The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Closed Economy   
 
3.1 The Model  
 
3.1.1 Overview of Gertler and Karadi Model (2011, GK)  
 
Gertler and Karadi (2011) incorporate New-Keynesian characteristics such as nominal frictions, real 
frictions, and financial frictions into their model. Nominal frictions represent stickiness and 
indexation of price. Adjustment costs of investment and utilization of capital are regarded as real 
frictions. One of interesting features of the model is the clearly specified distinctive role for banks. In 
contrast to Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), it is assumed banks have perfect information about 
firm’s returns. Accordingly, there is no Costly State Verification (CSV) problem.  
  
There are five kinds of economic agents: households, banks, intermediate good firms, capital 
producers, and retail firms. Furthermore, the Central Bank implements both of conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy. It is also postulated the Central Bank performs monetary policy 
based on a simple Taylor rule.    
 
 
3.1.2 Households  
 
Each household consumes goods. They also save through lending funds to banks. Households also 
provide labor. There are two types of member in each household: a fraction 1− f are workers; the 
remainder are bankers. A current banker remains a banker in the subsequent period with probability ; 
 is assumed to be independent of history. (1− )𝑓 bankers become workers each period. A former 
banker gives his total assets to the household. In turn, the household supplies start-up funds to new 
bankers; these enable a new banker to begin raising deposits and issuing loans and comprise a small 
portion of total assets.    
 
The household utility function is  
 
max 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑖[𝑙𝑛 (𝐶𝑡+𝑖
∞








where 0 < 𝛽 < 1, 0 < 𝜇 < 1, 𝜒, 𝜑 > 0. 𝐶𝑡 is household consumption and 𝐿𝑡 represents the number 
of working hours. Utility is separable in consumption and labor which is characterized by external 
habit formation captured by the parameter 𝜇.       
The household budget constraint can be described as    
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡𝐵𝑡 −  𝐵𝑡+1 + 𝛱𝑡 (3.2) 
 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the gross real return, 𝐵𝑡+1 is the short-term debt, 𝑊𝑡 is the real wage, 𝑇𝑡 is lump sum 
tax, and 𝛱𝑡 denotes a net payout to the household ownership which includes both of financial and 
non-financial firms. Both deposits in banks and government debt are one period assets.  
 
Specifically, households deposit funds into the bank in time t and receive non-contingent real gross 
return 𝑅𝑡+1 at t + 1. Since deposits in banks and government debts are one-period real riskless 
securities, they are considered as perfect substitutes.  
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The first order conditions of households with regard to consumption and labor supply can be 





𝐸𝑡𝛽𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅 𝑡+1 = 1 (3.4) 
with 
𝜚𝑡 = (𝐶𝑡 − 𝜇𝐶𝑡−1)
−1 −  𝛽𝜇𝐸𝑡(𝐶𝑡 − 𝜇𝐶𝑡−1)
−1  (3.5) 
 





where 𝜚𝑡 represents the marginal utility of consumption. 
 
3.1.3 Banks  
 
Banks are competitive. Banks acquire funds from households at non-contingent real rate 𝑅 𝑡. Then, 
bank loans these funds to firms at stochastic loan rate 𝑅𝑘𝑡. In addition, since banks purchase long- 
term assets with short-term deposits or debts, they can transform maturities.  
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘′𝑠  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡:  




where 𝑄𝑡 represents the relative price of each financial claim. 𝑆𝑗𝑡 denotes the sum of financial 
claims on non-financial firms which bank maintains. 𝐵𝑗𝑡+1 is the deposit that the bank obtains from 
households. Lastly, 𝑁𝑗𝑡 denotes the capital or net worth of the bank.  
𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙:  
 
𝑁𝑗𝑡+1  =  𝑅𝑘𝑡+1𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡  − 𝑅𝑡+1𝐵𝑗𝑡+1 





The net worth or capital of an individual bank evolves following equation (3.8). An excess in the 
return on assets (𝑅𝑘𝑡+1) over the funding cost (𝑅𝑡+1) raises bank profits and so contributes to 
accumulation of bank net worth. Any growth in bank net worth or capital is dependent not only on the 
spread of interest rate (𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) but also on the total quantity of assets (𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡).  
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘′𝑠 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒:  
 
Bank’s objective is set to maximize the expected discounted net worth of bank or the value of 
household’s financial claims on the bank.    
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑡 ∑  (1 − )
𝑖∞
𝑖=0 𝛽
𝑖+1𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1+𝑖(𝑁𝑗 𝑡+1+𝑖)   (3.9) 
where 𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1+𝑖 denotes the stochastic discount factor.  
 
  
- 17 - 
 
(Agency Problem of Banks)    
 
Complete information is assumed between banks and firms. This is different from the approach in the 
influential paper by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). They postulate an asymmetric 
information between banks and firms. By contrast, in the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model, there is an 
asymmetric information between depositors (households) and banks. Meanwhile, banks are able to 
divert some portion (𝜆) of their total financial assets, and shift such diverted assets to the household of 
which he or she is a member. For example, the banker is able to divert some portion of total assets by 
giving large dividends or bonuses to the household.     
 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘:  
 





The left-hand side represents the loss which the banker could face if diverting some portion of 
financial assets. Meanwhile, the right-hand side describes possible benefit from such diversion.  
  
Equation (3.10) reflects the fact that the bank is subject to a limited commitment problem. In other 
words, the bank can only lend to firms when the payoff from lending (𝑉𝑗𝑡) is larger than the utility 
from diverting funds (𝜆𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡).  
 
We can express (3.9) as 
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡 =  𝜈𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 +  𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡 (3.11) 
where 
𝜈𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{(1 − )𝛽Λ𝑡,𝑡+1(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝛽Λ𝑡,𝑡+1 𝑥𝑡,𝑡+1𝜈𝑡,𝑡+1} 
 






where 𝜈𝑡 represents the expected discounted marginal gain to the bank from extending financial 
assets 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡  by one unit while maintaining bank capital 𝑁𝑗𝑡  unchanging. 𝑡  represents the 
expected discounted value of holding additional bank capital 𝑁𝑗𝑡 while holding 𝑆𝑗𝑡 constant. 𝑧𝑡,𝑡+1 
denotes the growth rate of net worth and 𝑥𝑡,𝑡+1 represents the growth rate of total assets.    











Hence, the incentive constraint can be expressed as  
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Therefore, when the constraint in (3.10) binds, (3.11) can be expressed as      
𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 =  
𝑡
𝜆 − 𝜈𝑡
𝑁𝑗𝑡 =  𝜙𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡 
(3.17)  
  
Equation (3.17) implies that total lending is a multiple (𝜙𝑡) of the bank’s equity and so 𝜙𝑡 
represents leverage. Therefore, when there exists an exogenous negative shock to the bank capital or 
net worth, the volume of total lending will also be decreased. This reduction is magnified by the 
influence of leverage. This can cause a credit crunch and lead to deterioration in real activity. In 
conclusion, in the GK model, endogenous constraints on bank’s leverage are introduced based on an 
agency problem, namely that the bank’s ability to acquire assets is limited by its capital or net worth.   
 
 
Figure 3.1: The Commercial Bank Balance Sheet 
 
Assets  Liabilities  
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(Aggregate Bank Net Worth)  
 
Aggregate bank net worth is equivalent to the sum of existing bankers’ net worth (𝑁𝑒𝑡) and new 
entering bankers’ net worth (𝑁𝑛𝑡).   
 
𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙:  
 





A fraction  of banks in t will remain alive in t+1. Thus, the capital of existing bankers can be 
described as 
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡  = [(𝑅𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡)𝜙𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑡]𝑁𝑡−1 (3.19) 
Household transfers ω of aggregate bank capital. Such capital for new banker is given by  
 
𝑁𝑛𝑡  = 𝜔𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡−1  (3.20) 
where 0 < 𝜔 < 1 
 
In this model, it is assumed the startup fund that the household furnishes to the new banker in the 
form of a transfer is equivalent to some portion of total financial assets value3 which exiting bankers 
had intermediated in the final business period. Thus, such value of total financial assets in exiting 
bankers in the final period t is equal to (1 − )𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡−1.    
 
3.1.4 Intermediate Good Firms    
 
There exist many firms producing intermediate goods in a perfectly competition environment. Firms 
producing intermediate goods obtain capital at the end of t to manufacture final goods next period. 
They sell intermediate goods to retail firms.  
 
To finance financial expenditures, firms issue securities every period. Then, they sell such securities 
to banks. Capital value is the same as the value of financial claims. In other words, intermediate goods 
producers finance their capital acquisition from next periods capital stock by borrowing the amount 
𝑆𝑡 from banks.       
𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1  = 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡  (3.21) 
Intermediate goods producing firms produce 𝑌𝑚𝑡  employing capital and labor as inputs. The 
production technology is assumed to be   
 
𝑌𝑚𝑡  = 𝐴𝑡(𝑍𝑡𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡)
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼      (3.22) 
where 𝐴𝑡 denotes total factor productivity. 𝜉𝑡 is a capital quality shock. This provides a simple 
exogenous source for variation in the price of capital. Depreciation or obsolescence of capital can be 
reflected through 𝜉𝑡 . Thus, 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡  represents the quantity of effective capital. 𝑍𝑡  denotes the 
utilization rate of capital.   
 
3 Gertler and Karadi (2010) set this portion to 0.2% of total income in their simulations.  
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It is postulated that capital replacement costs are fixed and identical to unity. Then, the problem of the 
intermediate goods firms is      
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑚𝑡𝑌𝑚𝑡 + [𝑄𝑡 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡)]𝐾𝑡𝜉𝑡 − 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 − 𝑅𝑘𝑡𝑄𝑡−1𝐾𝑡     
 
(3.23) 
                𝐿𝑡, 𝑍𝑡  
 
where 𝑃𝑚𝑡 denotes the price of intermediate goods, 𝛿 represents the depreciation rate of capital that 
is a function of utilization rate (𝑍𝑡).  
  





  (3.24) 
where  denotes the elasticity of marginal depreciation regarding the utilization rate. Thus, a higher 
rate of utilization indicates a higher rate of depreciation in capital.     
 
















Differentiating (3.23) with respect to 𝐾𝑡+1 gives    
 










Equation (3.27) suggests the return on bank’s financial assets is same with the ex post return to capital 
because it is postulated all firms which produce intermediate goods earn zero profit.   
 
 
3.1.5 Capital Producing Firms  
 
In the end of every term, competitive firms which produce capital purchase capital from the firms 
producing intermediate goods in a competitive market. Capital producers fix depreciated capital and 
produce new capital. Then, they resell such refurbished capital to intermediate goods producers. The 
replacing cost for depreciated capital is equal to unity and new capital price per one unit is 𝑄𝑡 . There 
also exist flow investment adjustment costs related to manufacturing new capital. However, these are 
restricted to be dependent on net investment flow.  
 
max 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑇−𝜏𝛬𝑡,𝜏
∞
𝜏=𝑡 [(𝑄𝜏 − 1)𝐼𝑛𝜏 − 𝛯(
𝐼𝑛𝜏+𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝜏−1+𝐼𝑠𝑠
)(𝐼𝑛𝜏 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠)]   
 
(3.28) 
where 𝐼𝑡 is gross capital created. 𝐼𝑛𝜏 ≡ 𝐼𝑡 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡) 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 is net capital created and 𝐼𝑠𝑠 is investment 
in the steady-state. Equation (3.28) represents discounted profits for a capital producer. Function 𝛯 
implies capital adjustment cost. 𝛯(1) = 𝛯′(1) = 0, and 𝛯′′(1) > 0.       
 
First order condition relating to investment leads to the following capital price equation.   
 






)2𝛯′(∙)]     (3.29) 
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3.1.6 Retail Firms    
 
Similar to other existing DSGE models, nominal rigidities are incorporated via retail goods firms. 
Retailers purchase goods from intermediate good firms. They combine intermediate goods into 
differentiated final goods without cost. Then, they sell these final goods in a monopolistic market.     
 
Final product has a form of a composite of intermediate goods. Retail firms produce intermediate 
goods.   
 







where 𝑌𝑓𝑡 is output produced by retailer f and  denotes the substitution elasticity between goods. 
(  > 1)  
 
 





)−  𝑌𝑡 
(3.31) 







Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) include nominal rigidities in their model assuming each 
retail firm has a probability of 1 − 𝛾 of being able to set their price optimally. Retail firms maximize 
their profits over input demands. Retail firms take their retail prices but the price of final goods is 
given. Therefore, input demand functions and aggregate price level equation are derived from the 
first-order conditions of retailers.    
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑚𝑡𝐷𝑡 (3.33) 
where 𝐷𝑡 is an index of price dispersion and 𝑌𝑚𝑡 is intermediate goods production.   
 
 
𝐷𝑡 =  𝛾𝐷𝑡−1𝛱𝑡−1










where 𝛱𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
 is the gross inflation rate and 𝛾 is probability of keeping prices fixed.    
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The optimal price for retailers that are able to re-optimize price (𝑃𝑡
∗) is defined recursively by  
 
𝛱𝑡




𝛱𝑡  (3.35) 
where 



















By equation (3.35), (3.36), and (3.37), optimal pricing reflects expected demand and cost conditions 
in the future as well as present demand and cost conditions.  
 
Finally, inflation dynamics are given by  
 
𝛱𝑡
1− =  𝛾𝛱𝑡−1
𝛾𝑝(1− ) + (1 − 𝛾)(𝛱𝑡




3.1.7 Credit and Monetary Policies      
 
(Credit Policy)        
 
It is supposed the Central Bank facilitates lending during a crisis. The total value of intermediated 
assets consists of assets intermediated publicly through the government (𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑔𝑡 ) and privately 
intermediated assets (𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑡).  
 
𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡 = 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑡 + 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑔𝑡   (3.39) 
During a crisis, the Central Bank can furnish some portion (𝜓𝑡) of total intermediated financial assets.  
 
𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑔𝑡 = 𝜓𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡   (3.40) 
Because privately intermediated funds are constrained by bank’s capital, the total value of financial 
assets intermediated is given by  
 
𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡 = 𝜙𝑡𝑁𝑡 +  𝜓𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡 =  𝜙𝑐𝑡𝑁𝑡   (3.41) 
where 𝜙𝑡 and 𝜙𝑐𝑡 represent leverage ratios, respectively for privately intermediated and totally 
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(Monetary Policy)  
 
The objective of monetary policy is set to stabilize inflation and output. It can be postulated the 
Central Bank decides the risk-free nominal policy rate on household deposits following a traditional 
Taylor rule in normal times.   
 
𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)[𝑖 + 𝜅𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜅𝑦(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡
∗)] + 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑡 (3.43) 
where 𝑖𝑡 is the risk-free nominal interest rate. 𝜌 is a smoothing component in interest rate. 𝜅𝜋 is an 
inflation coefficient and 𝜅𝑦 is an output gap coefficient. 𝑡 denotes a monetary policy shock which 
follows an AR(1) process.     
 
The relation between the policy rate and real interest rate can be defined by the Fisher Equation.  
 
1 + 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
  (3.44) 
 
In a crisis, there is a tendency for credit spreads to rise sharply. Under this kind of environment, I 
assume that the monetary authority can inject credit in reaction to changes in the domestic credit 
spread relative to steady state value. The policy reaction rule by the Central Bank in terms of credit 
supply is  
𝜓𝑡 =  𝜓 +  𝜈𝐸𝑡[(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑡+1) − (𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅)]    (3.45) 
where 𝜓 is the fraction of publicly intermediated financial assets in the steady state. 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅 
is the credit spread in the steady state.   
 
Figure 3.2: The Central Bank Balance Sheet 
 







3.1.8 Resource Constraint and Government Policy  
 
The resource constraint in the economy is  
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 +  𝐼𝑡 + 𝛯(
𝐼𝑛𝑡+𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝑡−1+𝐼𝑠𝑠
)( 𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠) + G + 𝜏𝜓𝑡𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1    (3.46) 
 
Capital evolves according to the capital accumulation equation.  
 
𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡    (3.47) 
Finally, government expenditures are assumed to be financed through government intermediation and 
a lump-sum tax.  
 
G + 𝜏𝜓𝑡𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 =  𝑇𝑡 + (𝑅𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡) 𝜓𝑡−1𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡   (3.48) 
where 𝜓𝑡−1𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡 is the total quantity of government intermediated assets.  
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3.2 Empirical Results        
 
3.2.1 Calibration  
 
With regard to parameter values, in order to capture the unique macroeconomic characteristics of 
Korea, parameters are calibrated. Steady-state, average values of recent time-series data, and related 
literatures are broadly used in order to calibrate these parameters.    
  
In this model, there are 18 parameters. 15 can be regarded as conventional parameters which are often 
seen in other DSGE literatures, 3 parameters 𝜆, ,  are unique to the Gertler-Karadi model. For  
and , the values in Gertler and Karadi (2011) are used.    
 
Based on Korean data, the depreciation rate is set as 0.002. The labor income share and effective 
capital share are determined respectively as 0.6 and 0.4. The government expenditure share among 
output is also calibrated using the average value of government expenditure/nominal GDP from 2000 
to 2014. Data prior to 2000 is not used in the calibration process because it is judged that the Korean 
economy faced a structural break following the East Asian crisis at the end of 1997. Against this 
backdrop, the ratio of government expenditure per output in steady state is set as 0.137.    
 
In regard to other parameters in the model, similar to Gertler and Karadi (2011), I utilize values of 
Primiceri et al. (2006). Related parameters are habit persistence, the elasticity in the marginal 
depreciation relating to utilization rate, the inverse elasticity in net investment to capital value, the 
inverse Frisch elasticity in labor supply and the price indexation parameter. When it comes to 
substitution elasticity in goods, I used the conventional value which is widely used in the relevant 
literatures. In addition, the capital utilization rate is normalized in steady state.     
 
For discount factor, relative utility weight of labor, and price rigidity parameter, the estimated values 
of Yie and Yoo (2011) are used. For the Taylor rule coefficients of monetary policy, I used the 
estimation results of Kang (2007). He estimated the coefficients of Taylor rule in Korea. According to 
his estimation result, the inflation coefficient is 0.085 and output gap coefficient is 0.069 in Korea. 
Meanwhile, smoothing parameter in Taylor rule is estimated as 0.782.     
 
 





Korea GK Korea GK 
𝛽 Discount factor  0.988 0.990  
Elasticity of marginal 




Habit persistence   
parameter  
0.815 0.815 𝑖 
Inverse elasticity of  
net investment to  
capital value    
1.728 1.728 
𝜒 
Relative utility  
weight of labor  
12.00 3.409  
Substitution elasticity 
in goods  
4.167 4.167 
𝜑 
Inverse Frisch  
elasticity in labor  
supply 
0.276 0.276 𝛾 




Diverting fraction  
of capital  
0.374 0.381 𝛾𝑝 




Transfer to the  
entering bankers  
0.002 0.002 𝜅𝜋 
Inflation coefficient  
in Taylor rule 
0.085 1.500 
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Survival rate of  
bankers  
0.972 0.972 𝜅𝑦 
Output gap coefficient  
in Taylor rule 
0.069 0.5/4 
𝛼 
Effective capital  
Share 
0.400 0.330 𝜌 
Smoothing parameter  
in Taylor rule 
0.782 0.800 
Z 
Capital utilization  
rate in steady state  
1.000 1.000 G/Y 
Government’s  
expenditure/nominal 




Depreciation rate  
in steady state   







3.2.2 Experiment  
Gertler and Karadi (2011) simulate the effect of a shock to quality of the bank’s financial assets. In 
this regard, it is designed in their model that the shock to quality of bank’s assets amplify the 
deterioration in the bank’s capital because of their high degree of leverage. Based on this type of 
mechanism, they describe the dynamics of sub-prime crises in the US in 2008.      
 
The objective in this section is not to examine the negative spillover effect of global financial crisis 
that originated in the US on Korea. Rather, the aim in this section is to capture the dynamics of a 
crisis that arises in Korea assuming the disruption of Korean financial intermediation and the effects 
of credit policy intervention. Therefore, even though Korea could experience negative spillover 
effects from the disruption of financial intermediation that originated in the US in a period of the 
Global Financial Crisis in terms of a small open economy, this type of global spillover effect on 
Korea from the US in open economy is not considered in this section.  
 
A closed economy is assumed for simplicity in this section. Later, in chapter 4 and 5, the assumption 
of a closed economy will be relaxed, so that additional analysis for the crisis occurred in the large 
country such as the US will be conducted from the perspective of small open economy environment.         
 
 
(Crisis Simulation)           
 
Since the Great Recession in the late 2008, the repercussion of financial shocks on the real economy 
has been emphasized. In this part, the transmission mechanism of negative financial shocks such as a 
deterioration of the capital value of banks is analyzed in a closed economy environment. Two types of 
negative financial shocks, a capital quality and a bank capital shock are considered.    
 
① Capital Quality Shock (-5%)  
 
First, in order to conduct a crisis experiment in which the capital values of banks in Korea decline 
rapidly, I postulate that banks experience a negative five percent shock in their capital quality. Intially, 
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With respect to the transmission mechanism of a negative financial shock, the impact of negative 
capital quality shock can be classified as having two stages. In the first step, the decline in capital 
value reduces the quantity of effective capital directly. Then, this reduced effective capital curtails the 
value of financial assets again. In the second step, the balance sheet of banks is lessened through the 
bank’s leverage constraint. This reduced balance sheet contributes to the decline in asset price and 
investment. Then, output is also contracted. This kind of circular mechanism of negative financial 
shock transmission can be magnified through the leverage of the banks.      
 
In figure (3.3), the impulse response functions in reaction to negative five percent capital quality 
shock show the effective capital stock declines sharply by about -11% level over 3 quarters. In 
addition, the price of capital declines sharply. It decreases by roughly 14%.   
 
The bank net worth also declines very sharply, by more than -77%. And as a result of such a radically 
reduced bank net worth, the capability of the banks to lend is also limited. Against this backdrop, the 
external finance premium (EFP) soars sharply and investment and output decline as a result. 
Investment declines by about 19.0% immediately and reaches by -28.9% level over three quarters. 
Output declines by about 3.9% immediately, compared to long-term trend, and converges to the 
steady state over 80 quarters.   
 
Compared to Gertler and Karadi (2011), impulse response functions show that the Korean economy 
would also face a similar economic downturn to the US in the late 2008 in the future if similar crisis 
were to occur due to disruption of domestic financial intermediation. On the other hand, it seems that 
in Korea the impulse response to a negative capital quality shock is different from the US.    
 
Specifically, the impulse response of the bank’s capital is bigger in Korea than in the US. For instance, 
according to Gertler and Karadi (2011), bank net worth immediately declines to -50% in the US in 
response to the negative five percent shock. Meanwhile, for the same shock, bank net worth in Korea 
immediately declines to -77% level.       
  
However, for the external finance premium, it turns out the impulse response of external finance 
premium is smaller in Korea than in the US. Concretely, the external finance premium immediately 
soars more than five percent in the US in response to a negative five percent shock. For the same 
shock, the external finance premium in Korea rises immediately by about 1.7%.  
 
For real economy components such as consumption, investment, and output, the influence of the crisis 
is more persistent in Korea than in the US. Thus, considering all the above simulation results, it seems 
that if a similar capital quality shock were to occur in the financial sector of Korea, the negative 
impact would be felt relatively longer in Korea than in the US in 2008.  
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Figure 3.3: IRFs to a Capital Quality Shock (-5%) 
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② Bank Net Worth Shock (-5%)   
 
The financial shock can occur not only because of a negative capital quality shock but also because of 
a negative bank net worth shock. Therefore, a simulation for a negative five percent shock in the bank 
net worth is also conducted in this section.    
 
Following a negative five percent shock in the bank net worth, external finance premium soars by 
0.29% immediately. In addition, the value of the capital also declines by 1.7%. Simultaneously, with 
regard to components of real economy, investment reaches -5.5% over four quarters. Output also 
declines by 0.4% immediately and reaches about -0.77% over four quarters. Inflation also declines to 
-0.3% instantly.  
 
On the whole, it proves that the negative bank’s net worth shock can cause a similar economic 
downturn compared to the negative capital quality shock. However, for the same degree of the shock 
(-5%), the negative influence of bank net worth shock are weaker compared to equivalent size of 
negative capital quality shock.    
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Figure 3.4: IRFs to a Bank Net Worth Shock (-5%)
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(Credit Policy Simulation)        
The impact of credit policies by the Central Bank is analyzed for two types of financial shocks. The 
first financial shock is a negative five percent capital quality shock and another one is a negative five 
percent net worth shock of the banks. In addition, credit policy by the Central Bank is embedded into 
the previous model in the shape of a simple feedback rule. In the feedback rule, the feedback 
parameter (𝜈) reflects the intensity of credit policy intervention by the Central Bank.  
 
Model is simulated with three feedback parameters: 10, 50, and 100. When 𝜈 is equal to 10, it is 
closer to a real life. On the other hand, when 𝜈 is 50, it represents aggressive intervention of credit 
policy by the Central Bank. Especially, when 𝜈 is 100, it shows that the economy is closer to the 
optimum. It is also supposed the Central Bank conducts both of conventional monetary policy 
adjusting nominal policy rate and unconventional monetary policy such as asset purchase together. 
Therefore, the smoothing parameter (𝜌) in the Taylor rule of the Central Bank is fixed as zero during 
the period of the credit policy intervention.         
 
① Intervention for Negative Capital Quality Shock (-5%)   
 
Figure 3.5 shows performance of the credit policy intervention when negative capital quality shock 
exists. The credit policy intervention for a negative capital quality shock makes the crisis less severe. 
The credit intervention contributes to moderate the rise of the external finance premium (spread). In 
addition, the credit policy intervention helps to moderate the fluctuation of output. On the other hand, 
the influence on inflation seems insignificant because inflation dynamics do not change much after 
the credit market intervention.  
 
For the intensity of the credit policy intervention, it turns out that when 𝜈 is 50, the intervention by 
credit policy is more effective than when 𝜈 is 10. It seems that during a crisis, more aggressive credit 
policy intervention by the Central Bank can be more effective than a regular liquidity provision in 
terms of open market operation (OMO) as a stabilization policy.   
 
② Intervention for Negative Bank Net Worth Shock (-5%)   
 
Figure 3.6 shows the performance of the credit policy intervention by the Central Bank when a 
negative bank net worth shock arises. The credit policy intervention by the Central Bank for negative 
bank net worth shock also makes the crisis less severe compared to the instance of a negative capital 
quality shock.  
 
Similarly, the credit policy intervention also helps to reduce the rise in the external finance premium 
(spread) and helps to moderate the fluctuation of output. The influence of credit policy intervention on 
inflation is again small.  
 
Summarizing, the result of these simulations is that credit policy intervention by the Central Bank 
contributes to moderate economic contraction regardless of the type of shock. In particular, a more 
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Figure 3.5: IRFs to a Capital Quality Shock under Credit Policy 
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Figure 3.6: IRFs to a Bank Net Worth Shock under Credit Policy 
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3.3 Conclusion      
 
In this chapter, applying Gertler and Karadi (2011)’s New-Keynesian DSGE model into Korea, 
effectiveness of credit policy by the Central Bank is analyzed for two kinds of negative financial 
shocks. These financial shocks are negative capital quality and negative bank net worth shock. Both 
of shocks can occur during financial crisis period such as Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in the late 
2008 when financial intermediaries collapse.      
 
According to the simulation results, first, the credit policy intervention for negative capital quality 
shock makes the crisis less severe. For instance, credit policy intervention contributes to lower the rise 
in the external finance premium (spread). Then, as a result, the credit policy intervention also helps in 
moderating fluctuation of output. On the other hand, the influence of credit policy on inflation seems 
insignificant because inflation dynamics does not change considerably even after the intervention in 
the credit market. In addition, it also proves that during crisis, more aggressive credit policy 
intervention by the Central Bank can be more effective than a normal liquidity provision like open 
market operation as a stabilization policy.   
 
Second, the credit policy intervention for a negative bank net worth shock also makes the crisis less 
severe like the case of negative capital quality shock. Similarly, the credit policy intervention also 
contributes to reduce the increasing of external finance premium (spread) and is helpful to moderate   
fluctuation of output. The influence of credit policy intervention on inflation is also trivial like the 
case of the intervention for negative capital quality shock.  
 
When it comes to policy intervention, the simulation results demonstrate that credit policy 
intervention by the Central Bank can contribute to moderate economic contraction, regardless of 
negative capital quality shock or negative bank net worth shock. However, because policy experiment 
is conducted under the assumption of closed economy, the simulation results in this chapter have 
some limitations inevitably, when reflecting that Korea is considered as a typical small open economy 
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Table 3.2: The Model Summary 
Economic Agents    Equation 
1. Households  




  Euler equation 𝐸𝑡𝛽𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅 𝑡+1 = 1  
  Labor supply 𝑊𝑡𝜚𝑡 = 𝜒𝐿𝑡
𝜑
 






     
2. Banks  
  Marginal value of bank assets     𝜈𝑡 =  𝐸𝑡{𝛽𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1[(1 − )(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑥𝑡 𝑡+1𝜈𝑡+1]} 
  Marginal value of bank capital    𝑡 =  𝐸𝑡{(1 − ) + 𝛽𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1 𝑧𝑡 𝑡+1 𝑡+1} 
  Total leverage  𝜙𝑐𝑡 =  
𝜙𝑡
1−𝜓𝑡
   
  Private leverage  𝜙𝑡 =  
𝑡
𝜆−𝜈𝑡
   
  Increasing rate of bank capital   𝑧𝑡 𝑡+1 = (𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) 𝜙𝑡 + 𝑅 𝑡+1 
Increasing rate of bank assets  𝑥𝑡 𝑡+1 = (
𝜙𝑡+1
𝜙𝑡
)𝑧𝑡 𝑡+1  
Aggregate capital  𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1  = 𝜙𝑐𝑡𝑁𝑡  
Net worth evolution  𝑁𝑡  = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 + 𝑁𝑛𝑡  
3.Intermediate Good Producing Firms  
  Production function  𝑌𝑚𝑡  = 𝐴𝑡(𝑍𝑡𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡)
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼  
  Labor demand 𝑃𝑚𝑡(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑚𝑡
𝐿𝑡
 = 𝑊𝑡  
  Capacity utilization 𝑃𝑚𝑡𝛼
𝑌𝑚𝑡
𝑍𝑡
 = 𝛿′(𝑍𝑡)𝐾𝑡𝜉𝑡 = b𝑍𝑡 𝐾𝑡𝜉𝑡    






  Return on capital  




 + 𝑄𝑡+1 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡+1)] 𝜉𝑡+1
𝑄𝑡
  
4. Capital Producing Firms     
  Net investment 𝐼𝑛𝑡 ≡ 𝐼𝑡 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡) 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 















 −  1)2  
Capital accumulation  𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡    
5. Retail Firms   
  Final good production  𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑚𝑡𝐷𝑡 
Price dispersion  
𝐷𝑡 =  𝛾𝐷𝑡−1𝛱𝑡−1









Inflation dynamics  𝛱𝑡
1− =  𝛾𝛱𝑡−1
𝛾𝑝(1− ) + (1 − 𝛾)(𝛱𝑡
∗) 1−    
6. Monetary and Credit Policy   





𝑖)    
Credit policy  𝜓𝑡 =  𝜓 +  𝜐𝐸𝑡[(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑡+1) − (𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅)]  
7. Other Equations    
Resource constraint  𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡  + 𝛯(
𝐼𝑛𝑡+𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝑡−1+𝐼𝑠𝑠
)( 𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠) + G + 𝜏𝜓𝑡𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1  
Government constraint  G + 𝜏𝜓𝑡𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 =  𝑇𝑡  + (𝑅𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡) 𝜓𝑡−1𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡   
Fisher equation  1 + 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
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Chapter 4.  The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Small Open 
Emerging EconomyⅠ 
 
4.1 The Model    
 
4.1.1 Overview of extended GK Model in a Small Open Emerging Economy  
 
The closed economy Gertler and Karadi (2011) model can be expanded to a small open emerging 
economy. Such extension will allow us to assess two unconventional monetary policies conducted by 
Central Banks in emerging economies since the Great Recession in 2008: liquidity provision to 
specific export sector and credit enlargement to lower domestic interest rate spreads.     
 
I consider the open economy extension of Gertler and Karadi (2011) (hereafter, GK) model by Cantu 
Garcia (2013) in which banks can obtain funds not only from domestic depositors but also from 
global investors. In this model, similar to the closed economy GK model, six kinds of economic 
agents exist: households, banks, intermediate good firms, capital producers, retail firms, and global 
investors. The Central Bank is assumed to conduct both conventional and unconventional monetary 
policies.   
 
With respect to relevant New Keynesian DSGE model, there are not enough studies which review   
effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy in view of small open economies. Until a recent date, 
the literatures mainly examine the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy of large advanced 
economies such as US and EU. Even though large scale asset purchase program has been conducted 
in some large economies facing the Global Financial Crisis, conducting asset purchase program in a 
small open economy is not common owing to limited size or excess liquidity in domestic credit 
market.  
 
Therefore, some Central Banks in a small open economy such as Czech National Bank conduct 
intervention policy in a foreign exchange market as a way for enlarging their monetary base to boost 
real activity, instead of asset purchasing in the bond market. Reflecting this background relating to the 
use of monetary policy instrument, it seems that the model of Cantu Garcia (2013) is appropriate in 
analyzing the effects of the foreign exchange market intervention and comparing the effectiveness 





4.1.2 Households  
 
The modelling of households is similar to GK. Each household consumes goods, purchases financial 
assets and provides labor. In each household, two kinds of members exist: a fraction 1 – f is workers; 
the remainder are bankers. A current banker remains a banker in the subsequent term with probability 
;  is not time variable. The relative fraction of each sort is not changed.  (1− )𝑓 bankers 




4 The household furnishes new bankers with a start-up fund which is some portion of total financial assets. The 
size of start-up funds is small. The start-up fund’s main purpose is just to give new bankers initial funds with 
which to begin operations and be able to raise deposits.    
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The household utility function has a separable form in consumption and labor.  
 
max 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑖[𝑙𝑛 (𝐶𝑡+𝑖
∞





]   (4.1) 
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1, 0 < 𝜇 < 1, 𝜒, 𝜑 > 0. 𝐶𝑡 is the household consumption. 𝐿𝑡 denotes the number of 
hours worked. Utility has external habit formation which is captured by parameter 𝜇.    
The consumption index reflects consumption of both domestically-produced consumption goods (𝐶𝐻𝑡) 
and foreign-produced consumption goods (𝐶𝐹𝑡). A unit substitution elasticity is assumed between 
domestically and foreign produced consumption products. Meanwhile, it is postulated labor market is 
competitive.   
𝐶𝑡 =  𝐶𝐻𝑡
1−𝜍𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝜍  (4.2) 
 
The constant substitution elasticity between domestic and foreign consumption products can be 
decided as 𝜍. This parameter represents expenditure share on each country’s products in consumption 




  (4.3) 
𝐶𝐹𝑡 = (1 − 𝜍)
𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡
𝑃𝐹𝑡
  (4.4) 












  (4.5) 
  
𝑃𝐻𝑡 is the domestic price of domestic consumption products while 𝑃𝐹𝑡 represents the domestic price 
of foreign consumption products.  
Domestic and foreign consumption products are traded in a competitive global market. The law of one 






∗  (4.7) 
 
where 𝐸𝑋𝑡 represents nominal exchange rate representing domestic price of foreign currency, 𝑃𝐻𝑡
∗  
represents the foreign price of domestic good while 𝑃𝐹𝑡
∗  represents the foreign price of foreign 
product. 𝑃𝐹𝑡
∗  is set to be normalized to one.  
Both deposits of banks and government debt are one period assets paying gross real return which is 
𝑅𝑡 from t − 1 to t. These two are both riskless. Therefore, they are considered as perfect substitutes.  
Households can make deposits in banks or purchase government bonds. Therefore, household’s 
holdings of short-term debt can be represented as 𝐷. Then, household budget constraint can be 
written as   
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡+1 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛱𝑡 (4.8) 
 
where 𝑊𝑡  denotes the real wage and 𝑇𝑡  are lump sum taxes while 𝛱𝑡 stands for a payout to 
household ownership which include both financial and non-financial firms.  
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𝐸𝑡𝛽𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅 𝑡+1 = 1 (4.10) 
 
where the marginal utility of consumption is  
 
𝜚𝑡 = (𝐶𝑡 − 𝜇𝐶𝑡−1)
−1 −  𝛽𝜇𝐸𝑡(𝐶𝑡 − 𝜇𝐶𝑡−1)
−1  (4.11) 
 





4.1.3 Banks  
 
Banks are competitive. They acquire funds from households at the real interest rate (𝑅𝑡) or from 
global investors at global gross interest rate (𝑅𝑡
∗). Then, they lend them to non-financial firms at the 
stochastic loan rate (𝑅𝑘𝑡).  
 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘′𝑠  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡:   




where 𝑄𝑡 is the relative price of financial claim. 𝑆𝑗𝑡 denotes the sum of financial claims on non-
financial firms bank retains. 𝐷𝑗𝑡 denotes the deposits which bank acquires from domestic households 
and foreign investors. Lastly, 𝑁𝑗𝑡 is the net worth of bank. Thus, left side represents the value of 
financial assets of bank while right side is the value of liabilities of bank.   
Banks obtain funds not only from domestic depositors but also from global investors by issuing debt 
contracts. Foreign debt is denominated in the form of foreign currency. It pays global gross interest 
rate (𝑅𝑡
∗). It is postulated the banks take gross global interest rate as given.  






∗ + 𝑅𝑡(1 − 𝜙𝑡
∗)  (4.13) 
where 𝑅𝑡
∗ represents the global gross interest rate. 𝜙𝑡
∗ represents the ratio between foreign and total 
debt which is proportional of deposits in a bank that come from global investors. 𝑒𝑡 is the real 
exchange rate.   
𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ: 
 




Each bank’s net worth evolves following equation (4.14). An excess return on assets (𝑅𝑘𝑡+1) over 
funding cost (𝑅𝐷𝑡+1) increases the bank’s profits. As a result of that, it also increases the bank capital.  
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘′𝑠 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒:   
The bank’s objective is set to maximize bank’s terminal net worth, represented as  
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑡 ∑ (1 − )
𝑖∞
𝑖=0 𝛽
𝑖+1 𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1+𝑖(𝑁𝑗𝑡+1+𝑖) (4.15) 
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(Agency Problem of Banks)       
Complete information is assumed between banks and firms. This is different from Bernanke, Gertler, 
and Gilchrist (1999) who presumes asymmetric information between banks and firms. Instead, in GK 
model, an agency problem is set between depositors (households) and banks. Bank is able to divert a 
portion (𝜆) of financial assets and transfer such diverted assets to the household of which he or she is 
a member. In other words, an agency problem through moral hazard of bankers is introduced. 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘:  
 





Left-hand side represents what a banker could lose through diverting a portion of financial assets. 
Meanwhile, right-hand side represents possible benefit from such diversion.    
 
Equation (4.16) reflects the fact that the bank is subject to a limited commitment problem. In other 
words, the bank can only lend to firms when the payoff from lending (𝑉𝑗𝑡) is larger than the utility 
from diverting funds (𝜆𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡).  
 
First, in order to solve bank optimization problem, it is assumed 𝑉𝑗𝑡 has following functional form.    
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡 =  𝑉𝑗𝑡(𝑆𝑗𝑡, 𝐷𝑗𝑡) =  𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 −  𝑢𝑑𝑡𝐷𝑗𝑡 (4.17) 
where 𝑢𝑠𝑡 and 𝑢𝑑𝑡 represent time-varying marginal values of financial assets which banks hold in 
the end of each period. After removing 𝐷𝑗𝑡 in equation (4.17) using equation (4.12), the following 
equation can be derived. 
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡 =  𝑉𝑗𝑡(𝑆𝑗𝑡, 𝑁𝑗𝑡) =  𝜈𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 +  𝑢𝑑𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡 =  𝜈𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡 (4.18) 
where 𝜈𝑡 =  
𝑢𝑠𝑡
𝑄𝑡
− 𝑡   denotes the excess value of bank over its deposit. In other words, 𝜈𝑡 is the 
expected discounted marginal gain to a banker of expanding financial assets (𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡) by one unit, 
while keeping bank capital (𝑁𝑗𝑡 ) unchanging. At the same time, 𝑡  represents the expected 
discounted value of holding another unit of 𝑁𝑗𝑡, while maintaining 𝑆𝑗𝑡 unchanging. (𝑢𝑑𝑡 = 𝑡)        
 
As the next step, the Bellman equation for the bank’s value can be established.  
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡−1 =  𝑉𝑗𝑡−1(𝑆𝑗𝑡−1, 𝑁𝑗𝑡−1) = 𝐸𝑡−1𝛬𝑡−1,𝑡{(1 − )𝑁𝑗𝑡 +  𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑉𝑗𝑡(𝑆𝑗𝑡, 𝑁𝑗𝑡)} (4.19) 
 
In order to maximize 𝑉𝑗𝑡(𝑆𝑗𝑡, 𝑁𝑗𝑡), if Lagrangian method is applied subject to the incentive constraint, 
the following equation is derived.   
 
ℒ𝑡 =  𝑉𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡(𝑉𝑗𝑡 − 𝜆𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡) = (1 + 𝛾𝑡)𝑉𝑗𝑡 −  𝜆𝛾𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 (4.20) 
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The first order conditions based on optimization problem can be described as follow.  
 
(1 + 𝜇𝑡)𝜈𝑡 =  𝜆𝜇𝑡 (4.21) 
𝑉𝑗𝑡(𝑆𝑗𝑡, 𝑁𝑗𝑡) =  𝜈𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 +  𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡 >  𝜆𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 (4.22) 
  
Therefore, when constraint is binding, equation (4.23) can be derived.    
𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 =  
𝑡
𝜆−𝜈𝑡
𝑁𝑗𝑡 =  𝜙𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡  (4.23)  
 
 
The equation (4.19) can be rearranged using equation (4.18) and (4.23).  
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡(𝑆𝑗𝑡, 𝑁𝑗𝑡) = 𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1{(1 − ) +  (𝜈𝑡+1𝜙𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑑𝑡+1)}𝑁𝑗𝑡+1  
 
                                                   = 𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1 𝑡+1𝑁𝑗𝑡+1           
 
                                                   = 𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1 𝑡+1(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡+1𝐷𝑗𝑡)          (4.24) 
 
where 𝑡 = (1 − ) +  (𝜈𝑡𝜙𝑡 + 𝑢𝑑𝑡)   
 
 
Comparing equation (4.24) with equation (4.17), 𝑢𝑠𝑡 and 𝑢𝑑𝑡 can be determined.  
 
𝑢𝑠𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1 𝑡+1𝑅𝑘𝑡+1𝑄𝑡 (4.25)  
 
𝑢𝑑𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1 𝑡+1𝑅𝑡+1 (4.26)  
As a result, the following equation can be derived. 
 
𝜈𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1 𝑡+1(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) (4.27) 
Meanwhile, the time-varying marginal values of assets can be also expressed as follow.     
 
𝜈𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{(1 − )𝛽𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝐷𝑡+1) + 𝛽𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1 𝑥𝑡,𝑡+1𝜈𝑡,𝑡+1} (4.28) 
𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡{(1 − ) + 𝛽𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1 𝑧𝑡,𝑡+1 𝑡,𝑡+1} 
 
(4.29) 
where 𝑧𝑡,𝑡+1 represents the increasing rate of bank capital while 𝑥𝑡,𝑡+1 represents increasing rate of 
total financial assets.    






) 𝑧𝑡,𝑡+1      
(4.31) 
Because 𝜙𝑡 is not a factor applied to specific bank, the balance sheet in the banking sector at the 
aggregate level can be derived.  
𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡 =  𝜙𝑡𝑁𝑡  (4.32)  
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Figure 4.1: The Commerical Bank Balance Sheet 
 








from Domestic Households  
and Global Investors  
(𝐷𝑡)  
 







(Aggregate Bank Net Worth)  
 
Aggregate bank net worth is equivalent to the sum of existing bankers’ net worth (𝑁𝑒𝑡) and new 
entering bankers’ net worth (𝑁𝑛𝑡).    
 
𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙:   
 




Because a fraction  of banks in t will remain alive until t+1, existing bankers’ capital can be 
described as   
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡  = [(𝑅𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝐷𝑡)𝜙𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝐷𝑡]𝑁𝑡−1 (4.34) 
Household transfers ω of bank’s total capital. New banker’s capital can be given by 
 
𝑁𝑛𝑡  = 𝜔𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡−1  (4.35) 
where 0 < 𝜔 < 1 
 
In this model, it is assumed that startup fund household furnishes its new banker via a transfer is same 
with some portion of financial assets value exiting bankers had intermediated in the final business 
period. Thus, exiting bankers’ total financial assets in the final period is (1− )𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡−1.    
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(Global Credit Markets)  
 
For banks to borrow funds from domestic depositors or global investors, expected risk-adjusted cost 
from both sources must be the same. Therefore, the following uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
condition must hold.  
 




∗]} = 0  (4.36) 
The global interest rate (𝑅𝑡
∗) is assumed as the product of two factors. The first factor 𝛤𝑡
∗ is related to 
global economic state while the other factor (𝛷𝑡) reflects domestic condition.   
 
𝑅𝑡
∗  = 𝛤𝑡
∗𝛷𝑡 (4.37) 
where 𝛤𝑡
∗ can be regarded as global interest rate applied for risky financial assets.  
 
The domestic factor reflects the risk of the domestic economy appropriating interest payments by 
domestic residents to overseas financial institutions, where this risk is an increasing function of 
external debt of domestic government. Thus, it is assumed that   
 





∗ denotes net foreign debt of specific country and ∗ represents financial imperfection 
degree.    
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4.1.4 Intermediate Good Firms    
 
Many firms producing intermediate goods exist under a perfect competition environment. Firms 
producing intermediate products obtain capital in the end of each period t to manufacture final product 
in the next period. The produced intermediate products are sold to retail firms.  
 
For financing their activities, firm issues securities every period. Then, they sell the securities to 
banks. Capital price is equivalent to the value of financial claims. In other words, intermediate goods 
producers finance their capital acquisition for the next period 𝐾𝑡+1 by borrowing the amount 𝑆𝑡. 
Through arbitrage,    
 
𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1  = 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡  (4.39) 
 
Intermediate goods producing firms produce 𝑌𝑚𝑡 utilizing capital and labor as inputs. Production 
technology for intermediate goods is postulated as  
 
𝑌𝑚𝑡  = 𝐴𝑡(𝑍𝑡𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡)
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼      (4.40) 
where 𝐴𝑡 denotes the total factor productivity. 𝜉𝑡 denotes a capital quality shock which provides a 
simple source of exogenous capital value’s variation. Thus, 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 is effective capital quantity. 𝑍𝑡 
represents the utilization rate of capital. It is also assumed replacement cost of capital is fixed and 
identical to unity. Then, problem of intermediate goods firms is      
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑚𝑡𝑌𝑚𝑡 + [𝑄𝑡 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡)]𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 − 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 − 𝑅𝑘𝑡𝑄𝑡−1𝐾𝑡    
 
(4.41) 
                 𝐿𝑡, 𝑍𝑡  
 
where 𝑃𝑚𝑡 is the intermediate goods price while 𝛿 denotes the depreciation rate in capital which 
can be represented as a function of utilization rate.   






where  denotes the elasticity of depreciation in regard to utilization rate.  
 
 
















Differentiating (4.44) with respect to 𝐾𝑡+1 gives    
 










where 𝜉𝑡+1 is a capital quality shock and it gives a source of change in the capital return. Equation 
(4.45) indicates the return on bank’s financial assets is equal to the ex post return to capital because all 
firms producing intermediate goods earn zero profit under a competitive market.   
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4.1.5 Capital Producing Firms  
 
In the end of each term, firms which produce capital purchase capital from firms which produce 
intermediate goods in a competitive market. Capital producers fix depreciated capital and manufacture 
new capital. Capital producers resell fixed capital to intermediate goods producers. It is presumed 
replacing cost of depreciated capital is equal to unity. In addition, one unit value of new capital is 
equivalent to 𝑄𝑡 . There also exist flow adjustment costs related to manufacturing new capital given 
by 𝐼𝑛𝜏 ≡ 𝐼𝑡 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡) 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡. These are adjustment costs. 𝐼𝑛𝜏 ≡ 𝐼𝑡 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡) 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 is net capital created 
and 𝐼𝑠𝑠 is investment in the steady-state.   
 
max 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑇−𝜏𝛬𝑡,𝜏
∞
𝜏=𝑡 [(𝑄𝜏 − 1)𝐼𝑛𝜏 − 𝛯(
𝐼𝑛𝜏+𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝜏−1+𝐼𝑠𝑠
)(𝐼𝑛𝜏 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠)]  
 
(4.46) 
where 𝐼𝑡 is gross capital created. Equation (4.46) represents discounted profit for capital producer. 
Function 𝛯 means capital adjustment cost. 𝛯(1) = 𝛯′(1) = 0, and 𝛯′′(1) > 0.     
 
The first order condition regarding to investment gives an equation for the capital price.  
 









4.1.6 Retail Firms     
 
Like in other standard New Keynesian DSGE models, retail firms are introduced to add nominal 
rigidities into the model. Retailers purchase intermediate goods from intermediate good firms. There 
exists a continuum of firms producing final products who differentiate intermediate products into their 
own final goods without cost. Then, they sell them in a competitive final goods market including 
monopolistic features.  
 
Final output has a form of composite of final goods produced by each individual retail firm.   
 
𝑌𝐻𝑡 = [∫ 𝑌𝑓𝑡
−11
0
𝑑𝑓] −1   
(4.48) 
where 𝑌𝑓𝑡 is output by retailer f and 𝑌𝐻𝑡 is total final output.  denotes the substitution elasticity 
between individual final goods (  > 1).  
 
Through minimization of cost by final output users, the demand for each individual final goods can be 








with   
𝑃𝐻𝑡 = [∫ 𝑃𝑓𝑡
1−1
0
𝑑𝑓]1−  (4.50) 
The retailers choose the optimal price (𝑃𝐻𝑡
∗ ) for maximizing their profits.    
 







∏ (1 + 𝜋𝐻𝑡+𝑘−1)
𝛾𝑝𝜏
𝑘=1 − 𝑃𝑚 𝑡+𝜏]𝑌𝑓 𝑡+𝜏  
 
(4.51) 
where 𝜋𝐻𝑡 =  
𝑃𝐻𝑡
𝑃𝐻𝑡−1
 is the gross domestic inflation rate.      
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1 𝑃𝑚 𝑡+𝜏] 𝑌𝑓 𝑡+𝜏 = 0    
(4.52) 
 





1−  + (1 − 𝛾)(𝑃𝐻𝑡
∗ ) 1−  (4.53) 
Equation (4.53) can be expressed in the form of inflation term as the following. Hence, finally, 
domestic inflation dynamics are given by   
 
𝜋𝐻𝑡
1− =  𝛾𝜋𝐻𝑡−1
𝛾𝑝(1− ) + (1 − 𝛾)(𝜋𝐻𝑡
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4.1.7 Monetary, Credit, and Foreign Exchange Policies     
 
The monetary policy goal is set in order to stabilize inflation and output. Basic assumption is the 
Central Bank is able to decide the risk free nominal rate (𝑖𝑡) on household deposits following a 
traditional Taylor rule.  
𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)[𝑖 + 𝜅𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜅𝑦(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝐻𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝐻
∗)] + 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑡 (4.55) 
where 𝑖𝑡  is the risk-free nominal rate. 𝜌  is an interest rate smoothing component. 𝜅𝜋  is the 
inflation coefficient and 𝜅𝑦 is the output gap coefficient in Taylor rule. 𝑡 denotes an interest rate 
shock which is presumed as following an AR(1) process.     
 
According to the Fisher Equation, the relation for real and nominal interest rate is set.  
 
1 + 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝐷𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
  (4.56) 
In this model, Central Banks also conduct two kinds of unconventional monetary policy. First one is 
the intervention in the domestic credit market by providing direct loan to domestic non-financial firms. 
Meanwhile, second one is the intervention in a foreign exchange market.  
 
(Domestic Credit Market Intervention)  
 
In normal time, it is assumed monetary policy is conducted based on a conventional monetary policy 
rule such as the Taylor rule. However, during a crisis, there is a tendency for credit spreads to rise 
sharply. In this kind of environment, I assume that the Central Bank supplies credit in response to 
changes of credit spread following a simple feedback rule.  
 
𝜓𝑡 =  𝜓 +  𝜈[(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑘𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑡) − (𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅)]    (4.57) 
where 𝜓 represents a fraction of publicly intermediated financial assets in the steady state and 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅 denotes the credit spread (premium) in the steady state.   
 
(Foreign Exchange Market Intervention)  
 
The Central Bank can also intervene in a foreign exchange market for adjusting the real exchange rate 
using foreign reserves. Following the assumption of Garcia-Cicco (2011), the uncovered interest 
parity (UIP) becomes   
 




∗]} = 𝜑(△ 𝐹𝑋𝑡)  (4.58) 
where 𝜑 represents the sensitivity of deviations from uncovered interest rate parity to foreign 
exchange interventions. FX is the foreign reserve which is owned by the Central Bank (△ 𝐹X𝑡 =
 𝐹X𝑡 − 𝐹X𝑡−1).     
 
The Central Bank changes exchange rate by changing amount of foreign reserves. It is assumed the 
Central Bank alters the quantity of foreign reserve in response to the credit spread in global financial 
market. Feedback rule of the Central Bank is described as     
 
𝐹𝑋𝑡 =  𝐹𝑋 +  𝜈
∗[(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑡
∗) − (𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅∗)]    (4.59) 
where FX represents the foreign reserves in the steady state and 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅∗ represents the 
interest rate spread (premium) in the steady state.  
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Figure 4.2: The Central Bank Balance Sheet 
 


















4.1.8 Resource Constraint and Government Policy  
 
The economy wide resource constraint is  
 
𝑌𝐻𝑡 = 𝐶𝐻𝑡 + 𝐶𝐻𝑡
∗ +  𝐼𝐻𝑡 + 𝛯( 
𝐼𝑛𝑡+𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝑡−1+𝐼𝑠𝑠
 )( 𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠) + G + 𝜏𝜓𝑡𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1    (4.60) 
The domestic output (𝑌𝐻𝑡) is utilized for domestic consumption, foreign consumption, domestic 
investment, government consumption, and expenditures on financial intermediation.    
 
On the other hand, capital evolves according to following the capital accumulation equation.  
 
𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡    (4.61) 
The demand for domestic good of foreign consumers is expressed as    
 
𝐶𝐻𝑡




where 𝐶∗ represents the foreign demand for domestic good and is assumed as exogenous and 
constant for simplicity.     
 
Finally, expenditures of government are funded through lump sum taxes and government 
intermediation.  
 
G + 𝜏𝜓𝑡𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 =  𝑇𝑡 + (𝑅𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡) 𝜓𝑡−1𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡   (4.63) 
where 𝜓𝑡−1𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡 is the quantity of government intermediated assets.  
 
In addition, through aggregating budget constraints of the Central Bank and households, following 




∗  − 𝐶𝐹𝑡 − 𝐼𝐹𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡
∗  − 𝑅𝑡−1
∗ 𝐵𝑡−1
∗  + 𝐹𝑋𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡−1
∗ 𝐹𝑋𝑡−1 (4.64) 
where 𝐼𝐹𝑡 represents the imported foreign good component of investment.  
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4.2 Empirical Results        
 
4.2.1 Calibration  
 
With reference to parameter values, to capture the unique macroeconomic characteristics of Korea, 
parameters are calibrated similar to in chapter 3. Steady-state, average values of recent time-series 
data, and related literatures are used in calibrating parameters exogenously. In this extended model, 
the total number of parameters is 24. 6 parameters are additionally included compared to the closed 
economy Gertler and Karadi (2011) model in chapter 3. The parameter values in chapter 3 are 
consistently used if they are relevant in this model.    
 
On the other hand, some parameters relevant to a small open economy are calibrated newly. 
Specifically, preference bias for home goods is set following Lee and Yeo (2008). In addition, with 
regard to the ratio of foreign debt among total debt, the statistical value of money-flow tables as of the 
fourth quarter of 2015 is used. For the remaining parameters of export price elasticity, exogenous 
factor in foreign demand, curvature of international credit supply curve, and influence of change in 
foreign reserve on uncovered interest parity, I follow the values used in Garcia’s paper. For the Taylor 
rule coefficients, standard values are widely used. Coefficient on inflation and coefficient on output in 
standard Taylor rule is set as 1.5 and 0.5, respectively. In addition, smoothing parameter is assumed as 
0.782.     
 
 





Korea Garcia Korea Garcia 
𝛽 Discount factor  0.988 0.990  
Marginal depreciation 




Habit persistence   
parameter  
0.815 0.815 𝑖 
Inverse elasticity of  
net investment to  
capital value    
1.728 1.728 
𝜒 
Relative utility  
weight of labor  
12.00 3.409  
Substitution elasticity 
in goods  
4.167 4.167 
𝜑 
Inverse Frisch  
elasticity in labor  
supply 
0.276 0.276 𝛾 
Probability of   
keeping prices fixed 
0.525 0.779 
𝜆 
Diverting fraction  
of capital  
0.374 0.381 𝛾𝑝 




Transfer to  
entering bankers  
0.002 0.002 𝜅𝜋 
Inflation coefficient  
in Taylor rule 
1.500 2.043 
 
Survival rate of  
bankers  
0.972 0.972 𝜅𝑦 
Output gap coefficient  
in Taylor rule   
0.500 - 0.50 
𝛼 
Effective capital  
Share 
0.400 0.330 𝜌  
Smoothing parameter  
in Taylor rule 
0.782 0.800 
Z 
Capital utilization  
rate in steady state 
1.000 1.000 G/Y 
Gov’t expenditure/output  




in steady state   
0.020 0.025     




1.000 1.000 𝜙∗ 
Ratio between foreign 
and total debt 
0.091 0.300 




in the foreign 
demand 
0.424 0.424 𝛺 
Curvature of the int’l 
credit supply curve   
0.167 0.167 
𝜍 
Preference bias for 
home goods  
0.600 0.550 𝜑 
Influence of change in 







4.2.2 Experiment  
(Crisis Simulation in a Small Open Economy)           
 
The crisis experiments for three types of shocks are conducted. Those three shocks for the crisis are 
the global interest rate shock (+25bp), the capital quality shock (-5%), and the bank net worth shock (-
5%).     
 
① Global Interest Rate Shock (+25bp)  
 
The impacts of an increase in global interest rate applied to small open economies (SOEs) or 
emerging market economies (EMEs) is analyzed. As explained before, underlying assumption is that 
global interest rate is the product of global factor and local factor and there is +25bp shock in global 
interest rate due to some financial crisis. With respect to the shock, global factor affecting the global 
interest rate is represented as rstar in AR(1) process in the model. In addition, autoregressive 
coefficient of the global factor shock (rstar) is assumed as 0.95. It is also assumed that there is not any 
credit and foreign exchange intervention in the simulation. (𝜈 = 0 and 𝜈∗ = 0)  
    
Regarding the transmission mechanism of global interest rate shock, the increase in global factor 
affecting global interest rate represents a global risk aversion for emerging market economies which is 
amplified due to some global recession or crisis. Therefore, through this type of shock, around the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC), such influence of global risk aversion in emerging market economies 
can be analyzed.    
 
When the global interest rate increases, the real exchange rate can be appreciated because of the 
reduction in global interest rate spread based on uncovered interest rate parity channel. Furthermore, 
owing to the appreciation of exchange rate, the banks’ balance sheet can be also deteriorated because  
appreciated exchange rate increases the bank’s foreign debt. In addition, the domestic external finance 
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Figure 4.3: IRFs to a Global Interest Rate Shock 
 
 










- 56 - 
 
② Capital Quality Shock (-5%)   
 
In order to capture a negative capital quality shock on bank’s assets, it is assumed the banks face 
negative five percent shock in the value of their assets. This is similar to in chapter 3. In this model, a 
capital quality shock is represented as epsilon and autoregressive coefficient of the capital quality 
shock is assumed as 0.66 in AR(1) process following Gertler and Karadi (2010). It is also postulated 
that there is no credit and foreign exchange intervention in the simulation. (𝜈 = 0 and 𝜈∗ = 0)  
 
Similar to the transmission mechanism of negative financial shock in a closed economy, repercussion 
of negative five percent capital quality shock in a small open economy can be examined step by step. 
First, the first five percent drop in the bank’s assets reduces the quantity of effective capital. Since 
then, this type of dropped effective capital reduces the values of bank’s assets repeatedly. In the next 
stage, the lessened balance sheet of the banks cause the decline in asset value and investment based on 
the leverage. As a result of the reduced investment, output is also lessened finally.  
 
However, in this extended small open economy model, additional transmission channel is included. 
The negative five percent shock in the capital quality of the banks cause a steep appreciation of real 
exchange rate. Such influence also reduces international interest rate spread between domestic and 
global interest rate. Accordingly, resulted appreciation of real exchange rate can contribute to 
increasing import and decreasing export.  
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Figure 4.4: IRFs to a Capital Quality Shock
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③ Bank Net Worth Shock (-5%)   
 
To understand the effect of negative shock to bank net worth, the situation is postulated banks face 
negative five percent shock in the bank net worth. Like the cases of previous shocks such as global 
interest rate and capital quality, there is underlying assumption the Central Bank does not conduct any 
intervention in the credit or the foreign exchange market. (𝜈 = 0 and 𝜈∗ = 0)  
 
The transmission mechanism of negative bank net worth shock in a small open emerging economy 
seems to be similar to that transmission of closed economy. In response to negative five percent shock 
to a bank net worth, the risk premium increases immediately. Furthermore, the capital value also 
declines. As a result, the investment and output in a real economy are also deteriorated. Inflation also 
declines immediately.    
 
In broad outlines, the economic effect of negative five percent bank net worth shock seems weaker 
than the impact of same degree of capital quality shock in a small open emerging economy. This 
result seems to be consistent to the previous crisis simulation carried out in chapter 3 under a closed 
economy environment.  
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Figure 4.5: IRFs to a Bank Net Worth Shock
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(Credit and Foreign Exchange Policy Simulation)  
 
It is postulated that the Central bank in a small open economy conducts two sorts of unconventional 
monetary policies which are the interventions in the domestic credit market and the foreign exchange 
market. First of all, for the intervention in domestic credit market, it is postulated the Central Bank is 
able to directly lend to non-financial firms in response to increasing risk premium. On the other hand, 
when it comes to such intervention in the foreign exchange market, the Central Bank manages some 
amount of foreign reserves to influence on the real exchange rate based on uncovered interest rate 
parity (UIP) condition.     
 
With regard to feedback rule of policy reaction, there are two types of feedback parameters (𝜈 and 
𝜈∗). The feedback parameter (𝜈) reflects the intensity of domestic credit market intervention. On the 
other hand, another feedback parameter (𝜈∗) stands for strength of the intervention in the foreign 
exchange market. Simulations are implemented for three values of feedback parameters for the 
interventions of credit market and the foreign exchange market: 10, 50, and 100. When 𝜈 or 𝜈∗ is 
10, it is closer to a real life. On the other hand, when 𝜈 or 𝜈∗ is 50, it means there is an aggressive 
intervention in credit or foreign exchange market. Specific state which 𝜈 or 𝜈∗ is equal to 100 
represents the economy is near to the optimal situation.  
First, figure (4.6) and (4.7) show performances of the intervention in domestic credit market or 
foreign exchange market respectively, in response to global interest rate shock (+25bp). The 
intervention in domestic credit market for global interest rate shock makes the crisis less severe. 
Specifically, the domestic credit market intervention is helpful in reducing the increase of risk 
premium. However, inflation dynamics of output do not change drastically despite the intervention in 
domestic credit market. Meanwhile, the foreign exchange market intervention can be more effective 
than the intervention in domestic credit market. Figure (4.7) shows the intervention through foreign 
exchange market is contributed to considerably moderate negative impacts on external finance 
premium, output, inflation, and bank net worth.    
 
Next, figure (4.8) and (4.9) show performances of the intervention in domestic credit or foreign 
exchange market, respectively, for capital quality shock (-5%). The credit market intervention by the 
Central Bank for capital quality shock also makes the crisis less severe like the case of global interest 
rate shock. According to figure (4.8), it proves that the intervention in domestic credit market is 
helpful in reducing the increasing risk premium and moderating output fluctuation. On the contrary, 
the influence of the credit market intervention on inflation seems trivial. Meanwhile, figure (4.9) 
shows, although the intervention in foreign exchange market cannot affect the increase in external 
finance premium, it can make considerable contribution to make the crisis less severe for both output 
and inflation.  
 
Finally, figure (4.10) and (4.11) show performances of intervention in domestic credit and foreign 
exchange market, respectively, with respect to bank net worth shock (-5%). Figure (4.10) shows that 
similar to capital quality shock, the credit market intervention for bank net worth shock makes the 
crisis less severe. In other words, the credit intervention contributes to reduce increasing risk premium 
and moderate fluctuations of output and inflation. However, figure (4.11) shows the impact of the 
foreign exchange market intervention on fluctuation of output and inflation is very insignificant.  
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Figure 4.6: IRFs to a Global Interest Rate Shock under Credit Policy 
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Figure 4.7: IRFs to a Global Interest Rate Shock under FX Policy 
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Figure 4.8: IRFs to a Capital Quality Shock under Credit Policy 
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Figure 4.9: IRFs to a Capital Quality Shock under FX Policy 
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Figure 4.10: IRFs to a Bank Net Worth Shock under Credit Policy 
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Figure 4.11: IRFs to a Bank Net Worth Shock under FX Policy 
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(Comparison for Credit and Foreign Exchange Policy)    
 
First, figure (4.12) shows comparative results between credit and foreign exchange policy for global 
interest rate shock. It seems that the foreign exchange market intervention can be more effective than 
corresponding intervention in domestic credit market. Even though the intervention in the market of 
foreign exchange is less telling in directly affecting some change of domestic external finance 
premium, the foreign exchange intervention policy can be contributed to prevent an export from sharp 
decline through the reduced appreciation of exchange rate. Hence, such foreign exchange intervention 
policy can be supportive in preventing a sharp drop in output for global interest rate shock which is 
applied to emerging market economies during a crisis in terms of global risk aversion.       
 
On the other hand, figure (4.13) and (4.14) demonstrate comparative results of credit and foreign 
exchange policy for negative capital quality and negative bank net worth shock. It is regarded as the 
policy effectiveness of intervention in domestic credit market is slightly better than the intervention in 
market of foreign exchange in moderating the influences of negative shocks. When negative capital 
quality or bank capital shock arises in the domestic banking sector, the policy effectiveness of the 
foreign exchange market intervention is restricted because such foreign exchange market intervention 
cannot affect effectively increasing domestic risk premium. Hence, it seems that the intervention in 
domestic credit market is more successful than the foreign exchange market intervention in reaction to 
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Figure 4.12: Comparison of IRFs to a Global Interest Rate Shock 
under Credit and FX Policy 
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Figure 4.13: Comparison of IRFs to a Capital Quality Shock 
under Credit and FX Policy 
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Figure 4.14: Comparison of IRFs to a Bank Net Worth Shock 
under Credit and FX Policy 
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4.3 Conclusion  
 
For emerging market economies, the policy effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy such as 
the intervention in domestic credit market or the intervention in foreign exchange market beyond 
normal adjustment of nominal policy rate can considerably vary according to what type of shock 
occurs during a crisis.  
 
First, for negative five percent shock of global interest rate originated in the external sector, it proves 
that the foreign exchange market intervention can be relatively more effective than the domestic credit 
market intervention in light of moderating fluctuations of output and inflation. Meanwhile, for 
negative capital quality or negative bank net worth shock mainly originated in domestic financial 
sector, it turns out that the intervention in domestic credit market is slightly better than the foreign 
exchange market intervention for the perspective of policy effectiveness. It also seems that difference 
in policy effectiveness occurs whether the origin of the crisis is internal or external.    
 
Therefore, from a perspective of policy effectiveness, the Central Banks in an emerging market 
economy needs to conduct appropriate combinations of various unconventional monetary policy 
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Table 4.2: The Model Summary 
Economic Agents Equation 
1. Households  




  Euler equation 𝐸𝑡𝛽𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅 𝑡+1 = 1  
  Labor supply 𝑊𝑡𝜚𝑡 = 𝜒𝐿𝑡
𝜑
 






    
  Total consumption   𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶𝐻𝑡
(1−𝜍)𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝜍  




Foreign goods consumption  𝐶𝐹𝑡 = (1 − 𝜍)
𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡
𝑃𝐹𝑡




∗  = 1, normalization)  











∗  = 1, normalization)  
2. Banks   
  Marginal value of bank assets 𝜈𝑡 =  𝐸𝑡{𝛽𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1[(1 − )(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑥𝑡 𝑡+1𝜈𝑡+1]} 
  Marginal value of bank capital  𝑡 =  𝐸𝑡{(1 − ) + 𝛽𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1 𝑧𝑡 𝑡+1 𝑡+1} 
  Total leverage  𝜙𝑐𝑡 =  
𝜙𝑡
1−𝜓𝑡
   
  Private leverage  𝜙𝑡 =  
𝑡
𝜆−𝜈𝑡
   
  Increasing rate of bank net worth  𝑧𝑡 𝑡+1 = (𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) 𝜙𝑡 + 𝑅 𝑡+1   
Increasing rate of bank assets  𝑥𝑡 𝑡+1 = (
𝜙𝑡+1
𝜙𝑡
)𝑧𝑡 𝑡+1   
Aggregate capital  𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1  = 𝜙𝑐𝑡𝑁𝑡  
Net worth evolution  𝑁𝑡  = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 + 𝑁𝑛𝑡  





∗ + 𝑅𝑡(1 − 𝜙𝑡
∗)  
3.Intermediate Good Producing Firms  
  Production function  𝑌𝑚𝑡  = 𝐴𝑡(𝑍𝑡𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡)
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼  
  Labor demand 𝑃𝑚𝑡(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑚𝑡
𝐿𝑡
 = 𝑊𝑡   
  Capacity utilization 𝑃𝑚𝑡𝛼
𝑌𝑚𝑡
𝑍𝑡
 = 𝛿′(𝑍𝑡)𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 = b𝑍𝑡 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡    






  Return on capital  




 + 𝑄𝑡+1 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡+1)] 𝜉𝑡+1
𝑄𝑡
  
4. Capital-Producing Firms     
  Net investment 𝐼𝑛𝑡 ≡ 𝐼𝑡 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡) 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡     
Total investment    𝐼𝑡 = 𝐼𝐻𝑡
(1−𝜍)𝐼𝐹𝑡
𝜍     




Foreign investment   𝐼𝐹𝑡 = (1 − 𝜍)
𝑃𝑡𝐼𝑡
𝑃𝐹𝑡
 = (1 − 𝜍)
𝑃𝑡𝐼𝑡
𝑆𝑡
              















 −  1)2  
Capital accumulation  𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡    
5. Retail Firms   
  Final goods production  𝑌𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑌𝑚𝑡  
Price dispersion  
𝐷𝑡 =  𝛾𝐷𝑡−1𝛱𝑡−1









Inflation dynamics  𝛱𝑡
1− =  𝛾𝛱𝑡−1
𝛾𝑝(1− ) + (1 − 𝛾)(𝛱𝑡
∗) 1−  
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Economic Agents Equation 
6. Small Open Economy      
Domestic and foreign price  𝑃𝐻𝑡 = 𝐸𝑋𝑡𝑃𝐻𝑡
∗   
Demand for the domestic good of  





   




∗]} = 𝜑(△ 𝐹𝑋𝑡)  
Global interest rate  𝑅𝑡
∗ = 𝛤𝑡
∗𝛷𝑡 
Domestic factors affecting int’l rate  𝛷𝑡 = (−𝐵𝑡
∗)
∗
   
7. Monetary, Credit, and FX Policy   




𝑖)    
Credit policy  𝜓𝑡 =  𝜓 +  𝜐𝐸𝑡[(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑘𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑡) − (𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑘 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅)]  
Foreign exchange policy   𝐹𝑋𝑡 =  𝐹𝑋 + 𝜈
∗𝐸𝑡[(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅𝑡
∗) − (𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑅∗)]  
8. Other Equations    
Economy resource constraint 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝐻𝑡 + 𝐶𝐻𝑡
∗ +  𝐼𝐻𝑡 + 𝛯(
𝐼𝑛𝑡+𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝑡−1+𝐼𝑠𝑠
)( 𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠) + G +𝜏𝜓𝑡𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1    
Government constraint  G + 𝜏𝜓𝑡𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 =  𝑇𝑡  + (𝑅𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡) 𝜓𝑡−1𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡   
Fisher equation  1 + 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝐷𝑡+1
𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
     
Resource constraint  𝑃𝐻𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝐻𝑡
∗  − 𝐶𝐹𝑡 − 𝐼𝐹𝑡  = 𝐵𝑡
∗ − 𝑅𝑡−1
∗ 𝐵𝑡−1
∗  + 𝐹𝑋𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡−1
∗ 𝐹𝑋𝑡−1  
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Chapter 5.  The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Small Open 
Emerging Economy Ⅱ     
 
5.1 The Model     
 
5.1.1 Overview of Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki Model (2016, ABK)   
 
In this chapter, we consider the extension of Gertler and Karadi (2011) which is extended to a small 
open emerging economy. For this, the model of Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016) (hereafter, ABK) 
is used. ABK build a framework for the analysis of the transmission of external shocks to small open 
emerging countries. In their model, commercial banks in the domestic economy can obtain funds from 
both domestic depositors and foreign investors. In this model, there are five economic agents: 
households, banks, intermediate good firms, retail firms, and foreign investors. It is postulated the 
Central Bank adjusts nominal policy rate and intervenes in the foreign exchange market using foreign 
currency reserves.       
 
The “Taper Tantrum” of 2013 that followed comments by the then Fed Chair Ben Bernanke about 
scaling back asset purchases highlighted the vulnerability of many emerging economies to external 
shocks, such as the monetary policy decisions of Central Banks in advanced economies. In this 
context, we will use the ABK model to compare the effects of two different policy tools: adjustment 
of the nominal policy rate and intervention in the foreign exchange market.   
 
 
5.1.2 Households  
 
The modelling of households in this chapter is similar to Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2010). Each representative household consumes goods, purchases financial assets and 
provides labor. Households are composed of two types of members: a share (1 – f) are workers; the 
remainder are bankers. A household member who is currently a banker remains a banker in the 
subsequent period with probability . This probability  is independent of history and is the same 
for all households, so the relative fraction of each member in the household and in the economy does 
not change. A proportion (1− )𝑓 of existing bankers become workers in each period. On making 
this transition, a former banker remits all his assets to the household of which they are a member.5  
 
We assume that workers can save in deposit accounts held at domestic commercial banks. They can 
also purchase equity, although this has an additional management cost. All financial transactions 
between domestic and foreign agents is assumed to take place via domestic banks. So, workers cannot 
hold foreign assets or borrow from foreign investors. Although domestic deposits are denominated in 
domestic currency, borrowing from foreign investors is denominated in foreign currency. This implies 







5 The household furnishes new bankers with start-up funds that is some portion of total financial assets. The 
size of start-up funds is small. The start-up fund’s main purpose is just to give new bankers initial funds with 
which to begin operations and be able to raise deposits.    
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The utility function of a representative household is separable in consumption and labor, given by   
 








)]   (5.1) 
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1, 𝜒, 𝜑 > 0. 𝐶𝑡 is household consumption and 𝐿𝑡  denotes the number of hours 
worked.  
 




ℎ)6 + 𝐷𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡 + [𝑍𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑄𝑡]𝐾𝑡−1
ℎ + 𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛤𝑡 (5.2) 
 
where 𝐾𝑡
ℎ is the stock of equity the household holds. 𝑄𝑡 represents the real price of equity, 𝑓(𝐾𝑡
ℎ) 
denotes the cost of purchasing equity and 𝐷𝑡 is the household’s deposit at commercial banks. 𝑤𝑡 
represents the real wage, 𝑅𝑡 is the real interest rate paid on bank deposits and 𝛤𝑡   denotes real profits 
received by the household. [𝑍𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑄𝑡]𝐾𝑡−1
ℎ  represents the earning the household can acquire 
when they provide their funds to business directly without the intermediation by banks.    
 
The household choose consumption, labour supply, bank deposits and the amount of equity to 













1 = 𝐸𝑡  (𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅𝑡+1) (5.5) 
 









)       (5.6) 
 
𝑄𝑡 is price of equity in terms of goods.  
 
 
5.1.3 Banks  
 
Commercial banks operate in a competitive market. They acquire deposits from both domestic 
households and foreign investors. They issue loans to nonfinancial firms at the stochastic loan rate. 
Furthermore, the bank objective is to maximize bank’s terminal net worth, denoted as  
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘′𝑠 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒:   
𝑉𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛬𝑡,𝑡+𝑗
∞
𝑗=1




where 𝑛𝑡+𝑗 represents the net worth of bank, 𝛬𝑡,𝑡+𝑗 represents the stochastic discount factor, and  
represents the survival rate of the bank.  
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Equation (5.7) can be also represented as    
 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1[(1 − )𝑛𝑡+1 + 𝑉𝑡+1] (5.8) 
 
Meanwhile, the flow of funds constraint of a representative bank can be shown as  
 
𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ: 
 
𝑛𝑡  = [𝑍𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑄𝑡]𝐾𝑡−1









𝑏  denotes bank’s capital holding, 𝐷𝑡 and 𝐷𝑡
∗ are domestic real deposit and foreign debt, 
respectively, 𝑅𝑡
∗ is the gross global interest rate, 𝜖𝑡 denotes the real exchange rate.        
 
 
Meanwhile, the bank’s balance sheet can be represented as  
 
𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝑏 = 𝜙𝑡𝑛𝑡  =  𝑛𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡𝐷𝑡
∗ (5.10) 
Total capital is the sum of capital owned by banks (𝐾𝑡
𝑏) and capital owned by households (𝐾𝑡







In addition, capital evolves according to the equation of capital accumulation.  
 
𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡 (5.12) 






− 1)2]𝐼𝑡.   
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(Agency Problem of Banks)       
 
It is supposed that there exists an asymmetric information problem between banks and firms. Banks 
are able to divert a portion 𝜆(𝑥𝑡) of total financial assets. Banks also transfer diverted assets to the 
household of which he or she is a member.  
 
 








where 𝑥𝑡8 represents the fraction of assets borrowed from foreign investors.  
 
 
In equation (5.13), the left-hand side represents what a bank would lose through diverting a portion of 
financial assets. On the other hand, the right-hand side shows the benefits from a diversion. In other 
words, equation (5.13) reflects the fact that the bank is subject to a limited commitment problem. The 






Then, a representative bank decides the components of its’ balance sheet such as 𝐾𝑡
𝑏, 𝐷𝑡, 𝐷𝑡
∗ by 
maximizing its expected discounted value, given by.  
𝑉𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1[(1 − )𝑛𝑡+1 + 𝑉𝑡+1] 
 
(5.14) 
Dividing equation (5.14) by 𝑛𝑡, 𝜓𝑡 which can be interpreted as Tobin’s Q


































                     = [
𝑍𝑡+1 + (1−𝛿)𝑄𝑡+1
𝑄𝑡 
− 𝑅𝑡+1] 𝜙𝑡 + [𝑅𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1
∗ 𝜖𝑡+1
𝜖𝑡








2) (𝜅𝜆 , 𝜍 > 0), 𝜅𝜆  represents the degree of moral hazard of bank and 𝜍 
reflects the degree of domestic bias in the finance of bank.   







𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
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Then, applying the balance sheet constraint and leverage multiple10 into (5.15), the equation relating 
to 𝜓𝑡 is finally derived. Now, the bank decides the leverage multiple and fraction of foreign debt, 
(𝜙𝑡, 𝑥𝑡), in order to maximize Tobin’s Q ratio (𝜓𝑡).  
 
max  𝜓𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡𝜙𝑡 + 𝑢𝑑∗𝑡𝜙𝑡𝑥𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡    (5.18) 
subject to the incentive constraint  
 










where    
       𝑢𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡[ 𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1(1 − + 𝜓𝑡+1) (
𝑍𝑡+1 + (1−𝛿)𝑄𝑡+1
𝑄𝑡 
 −  𝑅𝑡+1)]    
                                   = 𝐸𝑡[𝛺𝑡 𝑡+1(
𝑍𝑡+1 + (1−𝛿)𝑄𝑡+1
𝑄𝑡 
− 𝑅𝑡+1)] > 0 
 
(5.20) 




∗ )]    




∗ )] > 0   
 
(5.21) 
                                      𝜈𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡[𝛺𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅𝑡+1] 
 
(5.22) 
𝑢𝑡  is the excess return on capital over domestic deposit, 𝑢𝑑∗𝑡  is the cost advantage of debt 
denominated in foreign currency over domestic deposit, 𝛺𝑡 𝑡+1 represents the stochastic discount 





Figure 5.1: The Commerical Bank Balance Sheet 
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5.1.4 Intermediate Good Firms    
 
Intermediate goods firms produce intermediate goods and sell these to retail firms in a perfect 
competition environment. Firms producing intermediate products get capital in the end of each period 
t to manufacture final product next period.  
 
 
Intermediate goods producing firms produce 𝑌𝑚𝑡 utilizing capital, imported good, and labor as inputs. 
The production functions for intermediate goods is  
 













)1−𝛼𝐾−𝛼𝑀      (5.23) 
Where 𝑌𝑚𝑡 is output, 𝐴𝑡 is total factor productivity, 𝐾𝑡 is capital, 𝑀𝑡 represents imported material 
inputs, 𝐿𝑡 is labour and 𝛼𝐾 and 𝛼𝑀 are the shares of capital and imported materials, respectively. 
𝜉𝑡 represents a capital quality shock that provides an exogenous change in the capital value. Hence, 
𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 is the effective capital. It is assumed that 𝜉𝑡 follows an AR(1) process.     
 
 













  (5.25) 
 








1−𝛼𝐾−𝛼𝑀      (5.26) 
Since intermediate firms operate in a competitive market, they set price equal to marginal cost, 𝑃 =
𝑃𝑡
𝐼 = 𝑀𝐶𝑡  , where marginal cost is given by (5.26).    
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5.1.5 Retail Firms     
 
 
Retail firms purchase intermediate goods from firms which produce intermediate goods. There exists 
a continuum of firms producing final products who transform identical intermediate goods into 
differentiated retail goods without cost. Then, they sell these in a monopolistically competitive final 
goods market.  
 
 
Final output has a form of a composite of retail goods produced by each individual retail firm.   
 










where 𝑌𝑓𝑡 is output by retailer f and 𝑌𝑡 is the final output.  denotes the substitution elasticity 
between individual final goods (  > 1).  
 
 









with   

























                𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑡  
 
where 𝛬0,𝑡 represents the stochastic discount factor.  
 
 
The solution to this problem implies the New Keynesian Phillips curve.     
 
𝜋?̂?  =  
−1
𝜅




 and 𝑦?̂?  = 
𝑦𝑡−𝑦
𝑦
 represents output gap, proportional deviation of output from steady 
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5.1.6 Monetary and Foreign Reserve Policies     
 
 
(Monetary Policy)  
 
The Central Bank’s objective is set to stabilize inflation. To do this, it sets the risk free nominal rate 
(𝑖𝑡) on household deposits following a traditional Taylor rule.  
 
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 = (1 − 𝜌𝑖)𝜛𝜋(𝜋𝑡 − 1) + 𝜌𝑖(𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑖) + 𝑡
𝑖   (5.32) 
 
where 𝑖𝑡  is the risk-free nominal rate, 𝜌𝑖  is an interest rate smoothing component, 𝜛𝜋  is the 
inflation coefficient and 𝑡
𝑖 denotes a monetary policy shock which follows an AR(1) process.     
 
The Central Banks also conduct two kinds of unconventional monetary policy. It intervenes in the 
domestic credit market by providing direct loan to domestic non-financial firms. It also intervenes in 




(Foreign Reserve Policy)     
 
We assume the foreign exchange market intervention is given following a FX intervention rule.  
 
𝐹𝑋𝑡 − 𝐹𝑋 = (1 − 𝜌𝐹𝑋)𝜛𝐹𝑋(𝜖𝑡 − 𝜖) + 𝜌𝐹𝑋(𝐹𝑋𝑡−1 − 𝐹𝑋) + 𝑡
𝐹𝑋 (5.33) 
 
where 𝐹𝑋𝑡 is the foreign reserve of the Central Bank, 𝜌𝐹𝑋 is a smoothing component of foreign 
reserve rule, 𝜛𝐹𝑋  is the coefficient of foreign reserve. 𝑡
𝐹𝑋  denotes the foreign reserve shock 




Figure 5.2: The Central Bank Balance Sheet 
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5.1.7 Resource Constraint    
 
 
Domestic output (𝑌𝑡) is utilized for domestic consumption, domestic investment and adjustment cost 
of investment, and export. In addition, there is also domestic output which is used for paying the cost 
of changing prices and managing the capital owned by households. This implies the economy wide 
resource constraint  
 
















2𝑌𝑡 is the cost of changing prices and 𝑓(𝐾𝑡
ℎ) is the cost of managing capital 
owned by households.     
 
 
GDP12 and net output are given by        
 
𝑌𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝜖𝑡𝑀𝑡  (5.35) 
𝑌𝑡





ℎ)  (5.36) 
where 𝑌𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃 represents GDP and 𝑌𝑡
𝑛 denotes net output.  
 
 
The evolution of net foreign debt is given by  
 
𝐷𝑡
∗ =  𝑅𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷𝑡−1
∗ +  𝑀𝑡 −
1
𝜖𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝑡  (5.37) 
 
 
In addition, total deposits denominated in foreign currency, comprising foreign currency deposits held 
at commercial banks and foreign reserve held by the Central Bank, are  
 
𝐷𝑡
∗ =  𝐷𝑡
∗𝑓




 represents the deposit denominated in foreign currency from foreign countries.   
 
 









∗   (5.39) 
 




) denotes the real exchange rate, 𝑃𝑡
∗ 
represents the price level of foreign country, 𝜑 represents a constant price elasticity of foreign 
demand, 𝑌𝑡
∗ denotes exogenous foreign demand. It is also postulated that 𝑃𝑡
∗ =  𝑃∗ = 1.     
 
 
12 GDP is equivalent to output minus import.     
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5.2 Empirical Results        
5.2.1 Calibration  
 
The 15 parameters of the model are calibrated to reflect the distinct macroeconomic characteristics of 
Korea, similar to the calibration strategy used in chapters 3 and 4. Where, possible, we calibrate using 
Korean time-series data; some parameters are also calibrated following Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki 
(2016).    
 
Some parameters, relating to the open economy aspects of the model have not been calibrated in 
previous chapters; these comprise the ratio of foreign debt to commercial bank’s total assets, the 
foreign debt/GDP ratio and the capital/GDP ratio. These are calibrated using the national statistics of 
Korea as of 2016.  
 
Other parameters, such as the cost parameter in household’s direct finance, the inverse elasticity of net 
investment to capital and the price elasticity of export demand, are calibrated using values in Aoki, 
Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016).  
 
Other parameters, for example the coefficients of the interest rate and foreign intervention rules are 
calibrated using standard values in the literature. In the interest rate rule, the coefficient on inflation is 
set as 1.5 while the smoothing parameter is set as 0.782, reflecting the structure of the Korean 
economy. In a similar way, in the foreign exchange intervention policy rule, coefficient on the real 





Table 5.1: Calibrated Parameters 
Parameters Description Value Parameters Description Value 
< Baseline Parameters >  
𝛽 Discount factor  0.988 𝜍 
Cost parameter in household’s 
direct finance  
9.85ⅹ
10−4 
ζ Domestic bias in funding 6.4 𝑖 
Inverse elasticity of  
net investment to capital value    
1.728 
𝜒 
Relative utility weight of  
labor  
12.00  Substitution elasticity in goods  4.167 
𝜑 
Inverse Frisch elasticity  
in labor supply 
0.2 𝛾 




Diverting fraction of  
capital  
0.374 𝜅𝐼 




Transfer to entering  
bankers  
0.002 𝜑 
Price elasticity of export  
demand  
2 
 Survival rate of bankers  0.94 𝛿 
Depreciation rate  
in steady state   
0.02 
𝛼𝐾 Share of capital  0.3 𝜌𝑖  
Smoothing parameter 
in interest rate rule 
0.782 
𝛼𝑀 Share of imported good  0.15 𝜌𝐹𝑋   
Smoothing parameter  
in foreign exchange rule 
0.782 
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< Baseline Steady State Values >   
𝑅∗ Global interest rate  1.02 
𝐾
𝑌−𝜖𝑀
   Capital/GDP ratio 16.5 
   𝑅 















  Foreign debt/GDP ratio  0.27 
𝜙 Leverage multiple 6 𝑌 − 𝜖𝑀  GDP 16.4 
𝑥 
Foreign debt/bank’s total 
asset  
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5.2.2 Simulation Results  
 
We analyse three types of shocks are conducted. We consider the effect of a 1% rise in total factor 
productivity shock, a 5% reduction in capital quality shock and a 50bp rise in the global interest rate.     
 
① A 1% Increase in Total Factor Productivity  
 
We model the total factor productivity shock as an AR(1) process having an autoregressive coefficient 
of 0.95. It is also supposed the Central Bank does not conduct any interest rate or foreign reserve 
policy in the simulation.     
    
The positive shock to TFP, increases net output, consumption, and exports. Net output and 
consumption are boosted by more than 2%. Exports increase by more than 1.5%. The real exchange 
rate depreciates, by less than 1%. Inflation decreases by 0.5% and the nominal interest rate decreases 
by 0.2%. In addition, investment and the price of capital increase by more than 2% and bank net 
worth rises by more than 10%. There is substantial persistence, reflected in a slow convergence of 
many of our variables back to their steady state values.    
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② A 5% decrease in Capital Quality  
 
Here we simulate the impact of a 5% reduction in the quality of financial assets held by banks. We 
model the capital quality shock as an AR(1) with persistence of 0.95. We again assume that the 
Central Bank does not conduct any interest rate or foreign reserve policy.        
 
The negative shock to capital quality lowers the quantity of effective capital and bank capital by 5%. 
In response, the price of capital drops by more than 1.5%. The real exchange rate appreciates, leading 
to a fall in exports of 0.25% and an increase in imports of about 2%. The inflation increases, leading 
to an increase in the interest rate. Consumption declines by more than 1% and investment falls by 
more than 1.5%. Output falls by more than 1%.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: IRFs to a Capital Quality Shock 
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③ A 50bp Rise in the Global Interest Rate    
 
We next analyze the impact of a 50bp increase in the global interest rate. This shock is modelled as an 
AR(1) process having autoregressive coefficient of 0.95. As before, we assume that there is no 
interest rate or foreign reserve policy conducted by the Central Bank.     
 
Following the shock, the real exchange rate depreciates by about 2.5%. As a result, exports increase 
by about 5% and imports drop by about 2%. Inflation increases by about 1%, leading to a rise in the 
nominal rate of 25bp. The capital price falls by more than 1%. With the combination of the decreased 
capital price and the depreciated real exchange rate, bank net worth also decreases, by about 4%. Net 
output and consumption both decrease by about 0.5%.   
 
 
Figure 5.5: IRFs to a Global Interest Rate Shock 
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(Foreign Reserve Policy Simulation)      
 
We also simulate the influence of the Central Bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, 
showing the effect of a 5% decline in the supply of foreign currency to the foreign exchange market 
by the Central Bank. Figure (5.6) shows the results.    
 
The decrease in foreign exchange market intervention causes a depreciated real exchange rate. 
Accordingly, exports, consumption and net output also increase. However, bank net worth decreases 
by 0.1% and asset prices decline by 0.05%. This reflects that the intervention using foreign reserve by 
the Central Bank can contribute to aggravate real activities through deteriorating financial 
intermediation to a certain degree.  
 
However, when these two opposite effects are considered synthetically, it seems that appropriate 
foreign exchange intervention using foreign reserve by the Central Bank can be helpful in boosting 
inflation and output.  
 
On the other hand, it also proves that as the intensity of the intervention is stronger, as the policy 
effectiveness is also bigger. Figure (5.7) demonstrates that the policy effectiveness is bigger when it is 
assumed that there exists positive 5% foreign reserve shock than when there is positive 1% foreign 
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Figure 5.6: IRFs to Foreign Reserve Policy 
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In this chapter, we analyze the effectiveness of interest rate adjustment and foreign exchange market 
intervention based on such approach of Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016), who extend the model 
Gertler and Karadi (2011) to the open economy.       
 
We also analyze the impact of shocks to total factor productivity (TFP), capital quality, and global 
interest rate. We investigate a positive TFP shock leads to an economic boom through its impact on 
consumption, exports and net output. Net output and consumption are boosted by more than 2%, 
while exports increase by more than 1.5%. On the other hand, real exchange rate depreciates by less 
than 1%. For other variables, inflation decreases by 0.5% and nominal interest rate decreases by 0.2%. 
This explains that because TFP shock occurs on supply side, inflation decreases and interest rate is 
lowered responding to such a falling inflation. In addition, investment and capital price increase by 
more than 2% and bank net worth rises by more than 1%.  
 
The negative capital quality shock causes a negative effect on the economy, as it reduces effective 
capital, which in turn reduces bank capital and the price of capital. The exchange rate appreciates, 
leading to reduced exports and increased imports. In addition, inflation rises, leading to an increase in 
the policy rate. The net effect is to reduce consumption, investment and net output.    
 
Finally, an increase in the global interest rate has ambiguous macroeconomic effects. Output and 
consumption increase following a real exchange rate depreciation. However, inflation and the policy 
rate increase. In addition, the price of capital falls, which, together with the depreciated real exchange 
rate, reduces bank net worth.     
 
Meanwhile, when it comes to policy simulation, according to the impulse response functions to 
foreign reserve policy when the Central Bank lowers its foreign reserve supply into foreign exchange 
market by 5%, the real exchange rate depreciates. Then, export increases and consumption and net 
output also increase. On the other hand, in the financial sector, it proves that bank net worth decreases 
by 0.1% and asset price also declines by 0.05% due to depreciation. This reflects that the intervention 
using foreign reserve by the Central Bank can contribute to aggravate real activities through 
deteriorating financial intermediation to a certain degree.  
 
However, when these two opposite effects are considered synthetically, it seems that appropriate 
foreign exchange intervention using foreign reserve by the Central Bank can be helpful in boosting 
inflation and output overall. Simultaneously, it also proves that as the intensity of intervention by the 
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Table 5.2: The Model Summary 
Economic Agents Equation 
1. Households  
  Euler equation   1 = 𝐸𝑡  (𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅𝑡+1) 






  Labor supply 𝑤𝑡  = 𝜒𝐿𝑡
𝜑
 









)   
2. Banks   
Excess return on capital  
over domestic deposit  




Cost advantage of debt denominated 
in the foreign currency over domestic  
deposit  





Return on domestic deposit  𝜈𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡[𝛺𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅𝑡+1] 
Net worth evolution  𝑛𝑡  = [𝑍𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑄𝑡]𝐾𝑡−1
𝑏 − 𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡−1 − 𝜖𝑡𝑅𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷𝑡−1
∗    
Balance sheet  𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝑏 = 𝜙𝑡𝑛𝑡  =  𝑁𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡𝐷𝑡
∗ 
Total capital  𝐾𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡
𝑏 + 𝐾𝑡
ℎ 
Capital accumulation  𝐾𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡         
3.Intermediate Good Producing Firms  













)1−𝛼𝐾−𝛼𝑀      












4. Retail Firms   






1−𝛼𝐾−𝛼𝑀      
Inflation dynamics  𝜋?̂?  =  
−1
𝜅
𝑀𝐶𝑡̂  +  𝛽𝐸𝑡(𝜋𝑡+1̂)  
5. Small Open Economy      
Foreign debt  𝐷𝑡
∗ =  𝑅𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷𝑡−1
∗ + 𝑀𝑡 −
1
𝜖𝑡
𝐸𝑋𝑡   







∗   
6. Monetary and Foreign Reserve Policy   
Interest rate policy rule     𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖 = (1 − 𝜌𝑖)𝜛𝜋(𝜋𝑡 − 1) + 𝜌𝑖(𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑖) + 𝑡
𝑖   
Foreign reserve policy rule  𝐹𝑋𝑡 − 𝐹𝑋 = (1 − 𝜌𝐹𝑋)𝜛𝐹𝑋(𝜖𝑡 − 𝜖) + 𝜌𝐹𝑋(𝐹𝑋𝑡−1 − 𝐹𝑋) + 𝑡
𝐹𝑋 
7. Other Equations    












Nominal GDP  𝑌𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝜖𝑡𝑀𝑡 
Net output  𝑌𝑡




2𝑌𝑡  − 𝑓(𝐾𝑡
ℎ) 
Fisher equation  1 + 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
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Chapter 6.  The Difference in Policy Effectiveness between Purchases of Private 
Securities and Long-Term Government Securities     
 
6.1 The Model  
 
6.1.1 Overview   
 
In this chapter, I examine the effectiveness of an asset purchase program in Korea. As the policy rate 
of Bank of Korea recently approaches the effective lower bound, some arguments start to be 
suggested that Bank of Korea should also conduct unconventional monetary policy such as a large 
scale asset purchase which is similar to QEs in advanced economies to boost real activities. However, 
the theoretical difference in policy effectiveness of diverse asset purchase has not been discussed 
deeply in Korea. Considering this kind of insufficient research in Korea, in this chapter we analyze 
the difference of effectiveness between purchasing private and long-term government securities in 
terms of Gertler and Karadi (2013).  
 
To do this, it is essential to model the difference in effectiveness of purchasing long-term government 
securities compared to purchasing private securities. In addition, it is also vital to examine the impact 
of zero lower bound on these purchases. In the study of Gertler and Karadi (2013), they examine the 
difference in policy effectiveness of asset purchases after dividing securities as private and long-term 
government securities and introduce the zero lower bound constraint. Therefore, I believe the 
approach of Gertler and Karadi (2013) is applicable in this chapter. This is an extension of Gertler and 
Karadi (2011) which is set in a closed economy. Gertler and Karadi (2013) investigate effects of asset 
purchase implemented in the U.S. in a period of the Great Recession. The authors reach three main 
conclusions. First, the framework they build is consistent with the existing evidence for large scale 
asset purchase. Second, purchases of private securities have more powerful effects than purchases of 
long-term government securities. Third, the effectiveness of asset purchases depends on whether 
short-term nominal rate is constrained to zero lower bound or not. In principle, it proves that these 
conclusions are applicable to Korea.   
 
6.1.2 Households  
 
Each household consumes goods, supplies labor and purchases financial assets. In each household, 
two kinds of members exist: a share 1 −  f are workers; the remainder are bankers. A current banker 
remains a banker in the subsequent term with probability ;  is not time variable. Hence, relative 
share of each sort does not change. (1− )𝑓 bankers become workers each period. A former banker 
gives his total assets to the household.  
 










]   (6.1) 
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1, 0 < 𝜇 < 1, 𝜒, 𝜑 > 0. 𝐶𝑡 represents household consumption and 𝐿𝑡 is number of 
hours worked. Utility has external habit formation which is captured by parameter 𝜇.  
The household holds bank deposits and short-term government debt (in periods when this is issued). 
Deposits in banks and government debt are one-period riskless financial assets paying gross real 
return (𝑅𝑡) from t − 1 to t. Hence, they are perfect substitutes.   
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We denote household holdings of short-term debt by 𝐵. Then, the household budget constraint can be 
expressed as     
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 −  𝐵𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛱𝑡  − 𝑋 (6.2) 
 
where 𝑊𝑡  denotes the real wage, 𝑇𝑡  are lump sum taxes, and 𝛱𝑡  is a payout to household 
ownership which contain both non-financial firms and banks. 𝑋 represents a transfer the household 
supplies to members who become bankers.   
 
 






𝐸𝑡𝛽𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅 𝑡+1 = 1 (6.4) 
 
where the marginal utility of consumption is  
 
𝜚𝑡 = (𝐶𝑡 − 𝜇𝐶𝑡−1)
−1 −  𝛽𝜇𝐸𝑡(𝐶𝑡 − 𝜇𝐶𝑡−1)
−1  (6.5) 
 




In general, this part is same in the previous chapters.  
 
 
6.1.3 Banks     
 
Banks are competitive. They acquire funds from households’ deposits at real interest rate (𝑅𝑡). Then, 
they lend these to non-financial firms at stochastic lending rate (𝑅𝑘𝑡). They also hold long-term 
government securities having the real rate of return (𝑅𝑏𝑡 ). Therefore, banks perform maturity 
transformation.13  
 
The financial assets of banks can be classified into two types. First, banks lend to nonfinancial firms 
who wish to fund their capital. Real rate of return on lending (𝑅𝑘𝑡+1) is     
 
𝑅𝑘𝑡+1  =





where 𝑍𝑡 is the net income flow to banks from a loan financing a unit capital, 𝑄𝑡 is the market 




Second, banks also own long-term government securities. It is postulated each long-term government 
security is a perpetuity paying one dollar per period, indefinitely. The real rate of return on long-term 
 
13 It is assumed that short-term government securities are retained by households and long-term government 
securities are retained by banks. Here, I use the approach of Gertler and Karadi (2010) that it is costly for 
households to manage directly the portion of long-term government securities in their portfolios.      
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where 𝑞𝑡 represents the price of a security and 𝑃𝑡  denotes the price level.    
 
In short, banks can hold both of private and long-term government securities. This changes the banks’ 
behaviors in that banks can reflect their preferences in an asset purchase.    
 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑗𝑡ℎ 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘′𝑠  𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡:   




where 𝑆𝑗𝑡 is the amount lent by the bank to non-financial firms, 𝑞𝑡 is the relative price of long-term 
government securities and 𝐵𝑗𝑡 represents the long-term government securities kept by the bank. 𝑁𝑗𝑡 
represents the capital or net worth of bank. 𝐷𝑗𝑡 denotes the amount of deposits the bank acquires 
from households.  
 
Therefore, the left-hand side shows the worth of bank’s financial assets. On the other hand, the right-
hand side is the worth of bank’s liabilities. 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡  is the loan portfolio of the bank and 𝑞𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑡 
represents the long-term government bond portfolio of the bank. In this chapter, the composition of 
banks’ balance sheet is different from those in the previous chapters in that long-term government 
securities are included.     
  
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ: 




Each individual bank’s net worth or capital evolves as described by equation (6.9). It demonstrates 
that bank’s net worth or equity capital is accumulated through retained earnings. Thus, the real return 
rate on loans or on long-term government securities influences bank net worth.    
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘′𝑠 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒:   
The bank’s goal is to maximize the terminal net worth of the bank, which can be expressed as    






The bank’s objective is the same as in previous chapters. However, in this chapter, the bank can hold 
a richer set of financial assets like private and long-term government securities.          
 
(Agency Problem of Banks)          
Similar to chapters 3, 4, and 5, perfect information is assumed between banks and firms. However, a 
moral hazard or costly enforcement problem between banks and depositors (households) is 
incorporated. The bank can divert some fraction of its financial assets and transfer diverted assets to 
the household of which he or she is a member. This agency problem is the same as in previous 
chapters.   
- 118 - 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘:  
 





The left-hand side represents the loss which the banker could face through diverting some fractions of 
their financial assets. Meanwhile, the right-hand side denotes benefit from diversion. It is assumed 
that the bank can divert funds from loans to non-financial companies more easily than funds from 
holdings of long-term government securities. It is modelled in that the banks can make illegal 
behaviors easier in managing private securities than long-term government securities because 
depositors can feel more difficult to keep watch for the performance of private securities than long-
term government securities. In this regard, it is postulated that 0 ≤  𝛺 <  1.       
 
Equation (6.11) reflects the fact that the bank is subject to a limited commitment problem. The bank 
can only lend to firms and hold the long-term government securities when the payoff (𝑉𝑗𝑡) from 
lending and holding the long-term government securities is bigger than the utility from diverting 
assets (𝜆𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝛺𝜆𝑞𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑡).  
 
The approach to analyzing the bank's optimal behavior in this chapter is similar to the procedure used 
in chapter 3, 4, and 5. However, main difference with the previous chapters is introduction of long-
term government security portfolio. In this chapter, by introducing long-term government securities, it 
makes it possible to analyze the difference in policy effectiveness between purchasing private and 
long-term government securities.    
 
 
The bank’s problem is more complex than in previous chapters. However, we will follow a similar 
approach. To solve bank’s optimization problem, it is supposed that 𝑉𝑗𝑡 has the following functional 
form.    
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡 =  𝑉𝑗𝑡(𝑆𝑗𝑡 , 𝐵𝑗𝑡 , 𝐷𝑗𝑡) =  𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑏𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑡 −  𝑢𝑑𝑡𝐷𝑗𝑡 (6.12) 
where 𝑢𝑠𝑡, 𝑢𝑏𝑡, and 𝑢𝑑𝑡 denote time-varying marginal values of financial assets which bank holds 
in the end of each period. After removing 𝐷𝑗𝑡 using equation (6.8), the following equation can be 
derived.  
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡 =  𝑉𝑗𝑡(𝑆𝑗𝑡, 𝐵𝑗𝑡 , 𝑁𝑗𝑡) =  𝜈1𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝜈2𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑡 +  𝑢𝑑𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡 
 
                  =  𝜈1𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝜈2𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑡 +  𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡 
(6.13) 
 
where 𝜈1𝑡 =  
𝑢𝑠𝑡
𝑄𝑡
− 𝑡  represents the excess value of loans over deposits and 𝜈2𝑡 =  
𝑢𝑏𝑡
𝑞𝑡
− 𝑡   is the 
excess value of holding long-term government securities over deposits. 𝜈1𝑡 represents the expected 
discounted marginal gain to the banker from extending loans to the non-financial firms by a unit, 
while maintaining bank capital 𝑁𝑗𝑡 unchanging. Similarly, 𝜈2𝑡 is the expected discounted marginal 
gain to the banker by expanding holdings of long-term government securities by a unit, while 
maintaining bank capital 𝑁𝑗𝑡 unchanging. 𝑡 represents the expected discounted value of holding 





- 119 - 
 
The Bellman equation for the bank’s franchise value can be expressed as      
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡(𝑆𝑗𝑡, 𝐵𝑗𝑡 , 𝑁𝑗𝑡) = 𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1{(1 − )𝑁𝑗𝑡+1 +  𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑉𝑗𝑡+1(𝑆𝑗𝑡+1, 𝐵𝑗𝑡+1, 𝑁𝑗𝑡+1)} (6.14) 
 
 
In order to maximize this, we can solve the constrained optimisation problem.     
 
ℒ𝑡 =  𝑉𝑗𝑡 + γ𝑡(𝑉𝑗𝑡  −  𝜆𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 −  𝛺𝜆𝑞𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑡) = (1 + γ𝑡)𝑉𝑗𝑡 −  𝜆γ𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 − 𝛺𝜆γ𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑡 (6.15) 
 
where γ𝑡 denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the incentive constraint of the banks, where γ𝑡 > 0 
when the constraint binds and γ𝑡 = 0 otherwise.  
 
The first order conditions imply  
 
[𝑆𝑗𝑡]  𝜈1𝑡 =    𝜆
γ𝑡
1+γ𝑡
  =   𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡,𝑡+1(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1)    (6.16) 
 
[𝐵𝑗𝑡]  𝜈2𝑡 =  𝛺𝜆
γ𝑡
1+γ𝑡
   =    𝐸𝑡?̃?𝑡,𝑡+1(𝑅𝑏𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1) (6.17)  
 
𝑉𝑗𝑡(𝑆𝑗𝑡, 𝐵𝑗𝑡 , 𝑁𝑗𝑡) =  𝜈1𝑡𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡 + 𝜈2𝑡𝑞𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑡  + 𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡 >  𝜆𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡  +  𝛺𝜆𝑞𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑡 (6.18) 
 
where ?̃?𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1∆𝑡+1 , ∆𝑡+1= (1 − )+ 
𝜕𝑉𝑡+1
𝜕𝑁𝑡+1
, ?̃?𝑡,𝑡+1  represents the augmented stochastic 
discount factor, 𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor. ∆𝑡+1 represents the multiplier.    
 
Hence, the following equation can be derived. Equation (6.19) implies that the bank’s portfolio size 
relative to its net worth is determined by the incentive constraint. When the asset measure in the 
bank’s balance sheet constraint is calculated, 𝛺 is applied to long-term government securities as a 
weight. This mirrors that weaker constraint on arbitrage is applied for long-term government 
securities than private securities.           
 
𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑗𝑡  +  𝛺𝑞𝑡𝐵𝑗𝑡  =  𝜙𝑡𝑁𝑗𝑡  (6.19)  
with 𝜙𝑡  =  
𝑡
𝜆−𝜈1𝑡
    
 
Figure 6.1: The Commercial Bank Balance Sheet 
 
Assets  Liabilities  
 
 













Capital or Net Worth  
(𝑁𝑡) 
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(Aggregate Net Worth of Banks)       
 
Banks’ total capital is equivalent to sum of existing bankers’ capital (𝑁𝑒𝑡) and newly entering bankers’ 
capital (𝑁𝑛𝑡).    
 
𝐿𝑎𝑤 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ:   
 




Since a fraction  of banks in time t will remain alive until t+1, the capital of existing bankers is  
  
𝑁𝑒𝑡  = [(𝑅𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡)
𝑄𝑡−1𝑆𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
+ (𝑅𝑏𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡)
𝑞𝑡−1𝐵𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
+ 𝑅𝑡]𝑁𝑡−1   (6.21) 
The household transfers ω of total bank capital. Hence, new banker’s capital is given by 
 
𝑁𝑛𝑡  = 𝜔𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡−1  (6.22) 
where 0 < 𝜔 < 1 
 
 
6.1.4 Intermediate Good Firms    
 
The model structure in this part is the same with Gertler and Karadi (2011). There exist many firms 
producing intermediate goods under perfect competition. These firms obtain capital from banks to 
produce intermediate products, which they sell to final goods firms.  
 
To finance their purchase of capital, intermediate goods firms issue equity which they sell to 
commercial banks. Capital value is equivalent to financial claims value. In other words, intermediate 
goods producers finance their capital acquisition for next period 𝐾𝑡+1 by borrowing the amount 𝑆𝑡, 
where, through arbitrage,    
 
𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1  = 𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡     (6.23) 
 
Intermediate goods producing firms produce output (𝑌𝑚𝑡) with capital and labor as inputs. They can 
also change the utilization rate (𝑍𝑡). The production technology is assumed to be   
 
𝑌𝑚𝑡  = 𝐴𝑡(𝑍𝑡𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡)
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼         (6.24) 
where 𝐴𝑡 denotes total factor productivity, 𝜉𝑡 represents a shock to capital quality which provides a 
exogenous source for the variation in capital value. Accordingly, 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 is effective quantity of capital. 
𝑍𝑡  represents utilization rate of capital. An additional assumption is that the cost of capital 
replacement is fixed and equivalent to unity. Then, the optimization problem of intermediate goods 
firms is      
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑚𝑡𝑌𝑚𝑡 + [𝑄𝑡 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡)]𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 − 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 − 𝑅𝑘𝑡𝑄𝑡−1𝐾𝑡    
 
(6.25) 
                 𝐿𝑡, 𝑍𝑡  
 
where 𝑃𝑚𝑡 is relative price of intermediate goods, 𝛿 denotes the depreciation rate of capital which 
is a function of utilization rate.   
- 121 - 
 





  (6.26) 
where  represents the depreciation elasticity in regard to utilization rate.  
 
 

























Differentiating (6.28) with respect to 𝐾𝑡+1 gives       
 
 
𝑅𝑘 𝑡+1  =
[ 𝑃𝑚𝑡+1 𝛼 
𝑌𝑚 𝑡+1
𝜉𝑡+1𝐾𝑡+1






Equation (6.30) shows that the return on bank’s lending to intermediate goods firms is equivalent to 
the ex post return to capital. This is because the intermediate goods market is competitive.  
 
 
6.1.5 Capital Producing Firms  
 
The model structure in this part is the same as in the previous chapters. The capital goods market is 
also competitive. In the end of each term, firms producing capital goods purchase capital from firms 
producing intermediate products. After capital producers fix depreciated capital, they create new 
capital. Then, the capital producers sell new capital to intermediate goods producers. It is assumed 
replacing cost for deteriorated capital is equal to unity. The unit value of newly refurbished capital is 
equivalent to 𝑄𝑡 . There also exist flow adjustment costs relating to creating new capital given by 
𝐼𝑛𝜏 ≡ 𝐼𝑡 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡) 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡. 𝐼𝑛𝜏 is net amount of new capital created and 𝐼𝑠𝑠 represents investment in 
steady state.   
  
 
max 𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑇−𝜏𝛬𝑡,𝜏
∞
𝜏=𝑡 [(𝑄𝜏 − 1)𝐼𝑛𝜏 − 𝛯(
𝐼𝑛𝜏+𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝜏−1+𝐼𝑠𝑠
)(𝐼𝑛𝜏 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠)]     
 
(6.31) 
where 𝐼𝑡 is gross capital created. Equation (6.31) represents discounted profits for a capital producer. 
The function 𝛯(∙) captures capital adjustment cost, where 𝛯(1) = 𝛯′(1) = 0, and 𝛯′′(1) > 0.    
 
 
The first order condition for investment gives  
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6.1.6 Retail Firms     
 
This part is also the same as in the previous chapters. As in other New Keynesian models, retail firms 
are introduced to add nominal rigidities into the model. There exist a continuum of firms producing 
final goods who costlessly differentiate intermediate goods into their own final goods, and sell these 
final goods under monopolistic and competitive market.    
 
Final product consumed by households is considered as a composite of the final products produced by 
individual retail firms.   
 
𝑌𝑡 = [∫ 𝑌𝑓𝑡
−11
0
𝑑𝑓] −1   
(6.33) 
where 𝑌𝑓𝑡 is output by retailer f and 𝑌𝑡 is total final output.  is substitution elasticity between 
individual final products in the composition of final output (  > 1).  
 









where the aggregate price level is  
𝑃𝑡 = [∫ 𝑃𝑓𝑡
1−1
0
𝑑𝑓]1−    (6.35) 
Retailers choose their optimal price (𝑃𝑡
∗) to maximize their profits.    
 







∏ (1 + 𝜋𝑡+𝑘−1)
𝛾𝑝𝜏
𝑘=1 − 𝑃𝑚 𝑡+𝜏]𝑌𝑓 𝑡+𝜏   
 
(6.36) 
where 𝜋𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
 represents gross inflation rate.      
 














1 𝑃𝑚 𝑡+𝜏] 𝑌𝑓 𝑡+𝜏 = 0   
(6.37) 
 





1−  + (1 − 𝛾)(𝑃𝑡
∗) 1−  (6.38) 
This implies that inflation dynamics are given by   
 
𝜋𝑡
1− =  𝛾𝜋𝑡−1
𝛾𝑝(1− ) + (1 − 𝛾)(𝜋𝑡
∗) 1−  (6.39) 
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6.1.7 Monetary and Credit Policies     
 
(Monetary Policy)     
 
Monetary policy is incorporated as the same way in the previous chapters. Monetary policy objective 
is to stabilize inflation and output. It is supposed the Central Bank adjusts risk free nominal rate (𝑖𝑡) 
paid on household’s deposits following a traditional Taylor rule.  
 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑖)[𝜅𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜅𝑦(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌
∗)] + 𝑡 (6.40) 
where 𝑖𝑡 is risk-free nominal rate. 𝜅𝜋 represents policy reaction to inflation and 𝜅𝑦 represents 
policy reaction to output gap. 𝜌𝑖 is smoothing operator. 𝑡 denotes interest rate shock following an 
AR(1) process.     
 
By Fisher Equation, connection between real and nominal interest rate is expressed as  
 
1 + 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
     (6.41) 
 
(Credit Policy)     
 
When crises arise, credit spreads rise sharply. In this kind of environment, I postulate the Central 
Bank supplies credit in response to the credit spreads in private securities or long-term government 
securities. They do so through large scale asset purchases.    
 
In regard to credit policy, it is supposed the Central Bank purchases some proportions (𝜛𝑠𝑡 and 𝜛𝑏𝑡) 
of the outstanding stocks of private securities and long-term government securities. This setting is 
different from previous chapters in that it is assumed in the previous chapters that the Central Bank 
supplies credit in reaction to changes of the credit spread relative to steady state value. Referring to 
US quantitative easing, 𝑆𝑔𝑡 and 𝐵𝑔𝑡 in this part can be considered as private securities such as MBS 
and treasury bond purchased by the Central Bank, respectively.    
 
𝑆𝑔𝑡 =  𝜛𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑡 (6.42) 
𝐵𝑔𝑡 =  𝜛𝑏𝑡𝐵𝑡 (6.43) 
where it is assumed that 𝜛𝑠𝑡 and 𝜛𝑏𝑡 follow second order stationary stochastic processes.  
 
In order to fund asset purchases, it is assumed that the Central Bank issues riskless short-term debt 
(𝐷𝑔𝑡) paying risk-free interest rate (𝑅𝑡+1) which are purchased by households.  
 
Thus, the balance sheet of the Central Bank is  
 
𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑔𝑡  +  𝑞𝑡𝐵𝑔𝑡  =  𝐷𝑔𝑡  (6.44)  
In addition, because the Central Bank is assumed not to be as efficient as commercial banks in 
financial intermediation, it is postulated that the Central Bank pays some efficiency costs, 𝜏𝑠 for 
loans and 𝜏𝑏 for government securities. In general, it is regarded that commercial banks are more 
specialized in lending procedure than the Central Bank because they have more detailed information 
about the financial status of borrowers.     
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In equation (6.44), 𝐷𝑔𝑡 is riskless short-term debt issued by the Central Bank. As long as interest-
bearing reserves and short-term government securities are close substitutes, large scale asset purchase 
financed by interest-bearing reserve can be considered to be equivalent to large scale asset purchase 
financed by selling some holdings of short-term government securities when it comes to policy 
effectiveness. Therefore, the finance through short-term government securities can be interpreted as   
the finance through interest-bearing reserve14 in this chapter.  
 
Therefore, in some economic states where financial intermediation cannot be conducted efficiently 
due to disruption in the credit market, the Central Bank can intervene in the credit market directly by 
furnishing Central Bank money into the very short-term reserve market. In this case, different from 
private financial intermediation, the Central Bank is able to inject funds without any limit because it 
can issue short-term liabilities without limit. In other words, for the Central Bank, there is no agency 
conflict. This represents the idea that during some huge financial crisis, the intermediation by the 
Central Bank can be critical in normalizing the financial market and boosting real activity because the 
Central Bank, unlike commercial banks, is not balance-sheet restricted.    
 
The total quantities of loans and long-term government securities are    
𝑆𝑝𝑡  +  𝑆𝑔𝑡  =  𝑆𝑡  (6.45)  
𝐵𝑝𝑡  + 𝐵𝑔𝑡  =  𝐵𝑡  (6.46)  
 
where 𝑆𝑝𝑡  and 𝐵𝑝𝑡  represents loans and holding long-term government securities by private 
intermediation, respectively. On the other hand, 𝑆𝑔𝑡  and 𝐵𝑔𝑡  denotes loans and long-term 
government securities which the Central Bank holds, respectively.    
 
 
Figure 6.2: The Central Bank Balance Sheet 
 














14 Reserves are deposits held by commercial banks at the Central Bank.    
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6.1.8 Resource Constraint     
 
Final output is composed of consumption, investment, investment adjustment costs, government 
consumption, and expenditures (𝛤𝑡) incurred from the Central Bank’s intermediation in the financial 
market. Thus, the economy-wide resource constraint is described as       
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 +  𝐼𝑡 + 𝛯( 
𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑡−1
 ) 𝐼𝑡 + G + 𝛤𝑡    (6.47) 
where 𝛤𝑡 =  𝜏𝑠𝑄𝑡−1𝑆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑏𝑞𝑡−1𝐵𝑔𝑡−1 , 𝜏𝑠  and 𝜏𝑏  are efficiency costs relating to the Central 
Bank’s intervention, respectively for loans and holding long-term government securities.    
 
Next, the supply of private securities is equivalent to the sum of newly obtained capital (𝐼𝑡) and 
remaining capital [(1−𝛿)𝐾𝑡] in the end of period t.    
 
𝑆𝑡 = (1−𝛿)𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡    (6.48) 
Finally, it is also assumed that the government fixes the supply of long-term government securities.      
 
𝐵𝑡 = B (6.49) 
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6.1.9 Allowing for Households to Maintain Private Securities or Long-Term Government   
Securities  
 
In this section, it is additionally postulated that households can hold not only long-term government 
securities but also private securities. Households can be restricted because households have to pay 
transaction costs when they hold both private and government securities.    
 
 
Holding costs relating to private or long-term government securities can be assumed respectively as 
follow. Households are able to maintain a certain amount15 of private and long-term government 
securities without cost. However, if households purchase more private and long-term government 
securities than steady state values, they have to pay transaction cost which are marginally increasing. 
Through this transaction cost, limited participation of households can be introduced into the model.     
 







  (6.50) 
where 𝑆ℎ𝑡 > 𝑆ℎ, 𝑆ℎ is value of households’ private securities holding in the steady-state.  
 
 







  (6.51) 
where 𝐵ℎ𝑡 > 𝐵ℎ, 𝐵ℎ is value of households’ long-term government securities holding in the steady-
state.     
 
 
According to equation (6.50) and (6.51), even though households can keep some amount of private or 
long-term government securities without any cost, they face transaction costs which have increasing 
function at the margin above the minimum level. Hence, when considering this type of households’ 
holding for private or long-term government securities based on incomplete arbitrage, the budget 
constraint of households in the previous subsection changes to be 
  
 








2]   
 





As a result of household’s optimization, the following equations for private and long-term 
government securities are derived.  
 
  𝑆ℎ𝑡 = 𝑆ℎ + 
𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1−𝑅𝑡+1)   
𝜅
  (6.53) 
  𝐵ℎ𝑡 = 𝐵ℎ + 
𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1(𝑅𝑏𝑡+1−𝑅𝑡+1)   
𝜅
  (6.54) 
 
 
The demands for private securities (𝑆ℎ𝑡) and long-term government securities (𝐵ℎ𝑡) are increasing in 
excess return relative to the curvature parameter (𝜅) with respect to the marginal transaction cost. In 
other words, according to the change of marginal transaction cost, demands in private and long-term 
government securities also change.   
  
 
15 𝑆ℎ and 𝐵ℎ  
- 127 - 
 
Next, through allowing households to maintain private or long-term government securities, the 
equilibrium conditions for private or long-term government securities in the previous subsection also 
change as follow.      
𝑆𝑝𝑡  +  𝑆𝑔𝑡 +  𝑆ℎ𝑡  =  𝑆𝑡  (6.55)  
𝐵𝑝𝑡  + 𝐵𝑔𝑡 +  𝐵ℎ𝑡  =  𝐵𝑡  (6.56)  
 
In addition, the aggregate portfolio constraint of bank also changes by allowing for households 
directly to hold private or long-term government securities in their portfolio.    
 
𝑄𝑡(𝑆𝑡 − 𝑆ℎ𝑡) ≤ 𝜙𝑡𝑁𝑡 +  𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑔𝑡 + 𝛺𝑞𝑡[𝐵𝑔𝑡 − (𝐵𝑡 − 𝐵ℎ𝑡)] (6.57) 
Therefore, for the large scale asset purchase program of the Central Bank to be effective through the 
adjustment of asset prices and excess returns, the limits for arbitrage for households and banks should 






6.2 Empirical Results           
 
6.2.1 Calibration  
 
In this model, the number of parameters is 20. Among those parameters, 12 parameters are standard. 
On the other hand, 8 parameters are additionally included in this model compared to traditional 
models. Those newly included parameters are , 𝜎, 𝛺, W, 𝜅, 𝑆ℎ, 𝐵ℎ, B.  
 
With regard to setting of parameter values, in order to represent macroeconomic characteristics of 
Korea appropriately, some parameters are calibrated similarly to chapters 3 and 4. Steady-state, 
average values of recent time-series data, and related literatures are variously used in calibrating 
parameters. When it comes to this process, some parameter values in chapters 3 and 4 are consistently 
used if they are still related with this modified model.     
 
In addition, regarding to some coefficients in standard Taylor rule, traditional values are used. 
Coefficient on inflation is determined as 1.5. Meanwhile, negative value of price markup is used for 
output term in standard Taylor rule. In addition, the smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule is 0.782 
following chapters 3 and 4.   
 
Finally, for other additional parameters in this model, annual average values for Korea from 2009 to 
2015 are used for the steady-state values of long-term government security supply, proportion of direct 
capital held by household, and the proportion of long-term government security held by households. 
There is consensus on that Korean economy has faced structural change since the Global Financial 
Crisis in 2008. Therefore, the statistics before 2009 are not used in the calibration. Relating to 
proportional advantage in government security’s seizure rate or portfolio adjustment cost, the original 
values in Gertler and Karadi (2013) are used.   
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Table 6.1: Calibrated Parameters 
Parameters Description 
Value 
Parameters Description    
Value 
Korea GK16 Korea GK 
𝛽 Discount factor  0.995 0.995  
Elasticity of marginal 
depreciation  
in utilization rate 
7.200 7.200 
𝜇 
Habit persistence   
parameter  
0.815 0.815 𝑖 
Inverse elasticity of  
net investment to  
capital value   
1.728 1.728 
𝜒 
Relative utility  
weight of labor  
12.00 3.482  
Substitution elasticity 
in goods  
4.167 4.167 
𝜑 
Inverse Frisch  
elasticity  
in labor supply 
0.276 0.276 𝛾 
Probability of   
maintaining prices  
fixed    
0.779 0.779 
𝜆 
Diverting fraction  
of capital  
0.345 0.345 𝛾𝑝 




Transfer to  
entering bankers  
0.0007 0.0007 𝜅𝜋 
Inflation coefficient  
in Taylor rule 
1.500 1.500 
 
Survival rate of  
bankers  
0.972 0.972 𝜅𝑦 
Output gap coefficient  
in Taylor rule   
-0.500 -0.12517 
𝛼 
Effective capital  
Share 
0.400 0.330 𝜌𝑖  
Smoothing parameter  
in Taylor rule 
0.782 0.000 
Z 
Capital utilization  
rate of steady state 
1.000 1.000 G/Y 
Government’s   
expenditure/GDP ratio 




in the steady state   
0.020 0.025     
 





seizure rate of 
government 
security  
0.500 0.500 𝐾ℎ/K  
Ratio of direct capital 




security supply in 
the steady state  
0.263 0.450 𝐵ℎ/B  
Ratio of long-term 
government security  




adjustment cost  







16 Gertler and Karadi (2013)  
17 As a proxy for output gap, the negative value of price markup is used.   
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6.2.2 Experiment             
 
In this policy experiment, it is supposed the Central Bank can purchase not only long-term 
government securities but also private securities in response to credit market state. Hence, the 
composition of the asset purchase implemented by the Central Bank is not identical compared to such 
policies discussed in chapter 3 and 4. In chapter 3 and 4, it was simply assumed the Central Bank was 
able to purchase just government securities, not private securities.   
 
Basically, it is postulated the intensity of asset purchases in the securities market depends on risk 
premium, regardless of whether they are long-term government securities or private securities. In 
regard to feedback parameters in the credit policy rule, the feedback parameter for purchasing private 
securities is set as 𝜈𝑘 and feedback parameter for purchasing long-term government securities is 𝜈𝐵, 
respectively. In addition, the values for feedback parameter such as 𝜈𝑘 and 𝜈𝐵 are both set as 10, to 
consider same degree of the Central Bank’s intervention. When feedback parameter is set as 10, it 
usually represents that it is closer to a real economic condition. Under this condition, the share of 
cumulative purchase by the Central Bank is set as three percent of GDP in both cases.  
 
During the Global Financial Crisis, European Central Bank (ECB) initially purchased securities which 
was equivalent to about 2.4% of annual GDP in its Securities Markets Programme (SMP). They 
implemented such asset purchase policy in terms of supporting traditional interest rate policy as a 
complement, not as a substitute. Reflecting on this case, we establish the cumulative intensity in 
intervention for private or long-term government securities market as 3% of annual GDP.  
 
With regard to zero lower bound, it is postulated adjustment of the policy rate by the Central Bank is 
restricted near zero lower bound for first consecutive four quarters. After the consecutive four quarters, 
the policy rate is assumed to flexibly fluctuate according to traditional Taylor rule set in the model. In 
addition, the portfolio adjustment cost of the household is fixed as unity following the approach of 
Gertler and Karadi (2013). They argue that when the portfolio adjustment cost is unity, simulation of 
the model approximates the real effects of QE2 well.  
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(Difference in Policy Effectiveness between Purchasing Private Securities and Long-Term 
Government Securities)    
 
Policy simulations suggest purchase of private securities by the Central Bank can be more effective 
than purchase of long-term government securities in stabilizing some financial market distress and 
boosting real activities when it is assumed that the feedback parameters of the two types of purchases 
are same (𝜈𝑘 = 𝜈𝐵 = 10).  
 
The concrete outcome of simulation is reported in the figure (6.3). The blue line reports the response 
to purchase of private securities. On the other hand, the red line demonstrates reaction to purchase of 
long-term government securities. According to such simulation results, purchases of both private and 
long-term government securities make contributions in boosting output and inflation. Both purchases 
are useful in reducing risk premium or excess return of each security, then it triggers to raise the asset 
price and the net worth of banks. Finally, both large-scale asset purchases contribute to recover the 
negative impacts of economic crisis.  
 
However, according to the simulations, in terms of policy effectiveness, similar sized asset purchases 
for long-term government securities or private securities affect real and financial economy to different 
degree. In other words, it turns out that if the intensity of intervention is similar, purchasing private 
securities can be more effective in boosting real activities and inflation than purchasing same amount 
of long-term government securities. Figure (6.3) proves the policy effectiveness for purchasing 
private securities is larger than purchasing long-term government securities in changes of spread, 
asset price, bank net worth, inflation, and output.   
 
These results reflect that when the Central Bank purchases private securities, the balance sheet of the 
banks can be more relaxed compared to when purchasing long-term government securities. This kind 
of purchase of private securities can be contributed to increasing the market demand for private 
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Figure 6.3: Difference in Policy Effectiveness 
between Purchasing Private Securities and Long-Term Government Securities 
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(Difference in Policy Effectiveness for Large Scale Asset Purchase under ZLB and Non-ZLB)     
The effectiveness of purchases of private or long-term government securities vary considerably 
according on the economic state that adjustment in nominal policy rate is restricted or not, to zero 
lower bound (ZLB) constraint. In order to understand difference in policy effectiveness for large scale 
asset purchase policy under a zero lower bound or non-zero lower bound, the policy rate is artificially 
manipulated in the model referring to two scenarios. In the first scenario, the short-term policy rate is 
fixed for first four quarters in order to build a policy environment which is similar to zero lower 
bound restriction. Meanwhile, the policy rate is allowed to be flexibly adjusted following the 
traditional Taylor rule in the second scenario.         
 
Asset purchase policy is more effective when facing zero lower bound for some periods than when 
short-term policy rate is adjusted immediately in response to large scale asset purchase shock. When 
the Central Bank maneuvers its nominal policy rate immediately according to Taylor rule shortly after 
fulfillment in large scale asset purchase program, such policy effectiveness of asset purchase is shrunk 
compared to the case of fixed policy rate, regardless of what types of assets are purchased. From this 
perspective, figure (6.4) and (6.5) indicate that the policy effectiveness by large scale asset purchase 
can be larger when the policy rate is not altered instantaneously in response to the asset purchase, in 
both cases of purchasing private securities or long-term government securities.  
 
In sum, this finding has implication that the intermediation through the Central Bank in private or 
long-term government securities markets is more effective when the policy is conducted under the 
fixed nominal policy rate for some terms. It is because the effect of asset purchase cannot be offset by 
the instantaneous change of short-term policy rate when the policy rate is restricted at zero lower 
bound. Meanwhile, if the policy is not restricted at the zero lower bound, the effectiveness of asset 





(Difference in Policy Effectiveness for Large Scale Asset Purchase under Household 
Segmentation)  
 
In this part, it is postulated that households cannot hold long-term private or government securities. 
This is different from the previous assumption that household can hold financial assets. According to 
the results of simulations, the policy effectiveness of asset purchase becomes weaker when it is 
postulated that the household cannot maintain any financial assets including long-term private 
securities or government securities. The increases in output and inflation caused by asset purchase are 
weaker when assuming the financial asset segmentation of household in long-term private securities 
or government securities, compared to possible state of the household’s financial asset holding. Figure 
(6.6) and (6.7) demonstrate this difference.  
 
This reflects that under household’s financial asset segmentation because the pool of actively traded 
securities in the securities market decreases, the portion of asset purchase by the Central Bank can be 









Figure 6.4: Difference in Policy Effectiveness for Long-Term Government Securities 
under ZLB and non-ZLB 
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Figure 6.5: Difference in Policy Effectiveness for Private Securities 
under ZLB and non-ZLB 
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Figure 6.6: Difference in Policy Effectiveness for Long-Term Government Securities 
under Household Segmentation 
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Figure 6.7: Difference in Policy Effectiveness for Private Securities 
under Household Segmentation 
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6.3 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, theoretical differences in policy effectiveness are analyzed in term of three 
perspectives applying Gertler and Karadi (2013) typed New-Keynesian DSGE model into Korean 
economy. Such three perspectives are the differences of policy effectiveness which occur between 
purchasing private securities and long-term government securities, between under zero lower bound 
and non-zero lower bound, and between household’s asset segmentation and non-asset segmentation.   
 
First, according to policy simulations, it proves purchase of private securities can be more successful 
than purchase of long-term government securities in terms of stabilizing financial market distress and 
boosting real activities such as investment and output. In other words, when it is postulated that 
intervention is conducted in the same degree 18 , purchasing private securities including MBS, 
corporate bonds, commercial papers, etc. can be more effective in boosting real activities and inflation 
than purchasing similar degree of long-term government securities.       
 
Second, it also turns out that the policy effectiveness for large scale asset purchase can be 
considerably different according to whether the economic and financial environment is restricted by 
zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint or not. According to the result of policy experiment, it seems that 
such large scale asset purchase can be more effective when the Central Bank faces the zero lower 
bound constraint for some periods than when the short-term policy rate can be adjusted immediately 
in reaction to large scale asset purchase shock. Specifically, if the Central Bank can adjust its nominal 
policy rate immediately, for instance following typical Taylor rule, with implementation of large asset 
purchase program, the intensity of policy effectiveness in such large scale asset purchase program can 
be offset by flexible adjustment of interest rate. 
 
Third, the policy effectiveness of large scale asset purchase can also become weaker when it is 
postulated that household cannot keep any financial assets directly such as long-term private or 
government securities. Namely, it demonstrates that the increases in output and inflation through large 
scale asset purchase by the Central Bank become weaker when assuming households’ financial assets 






18 The intensity of intervention is determined as 3% of annual GDP of Korea.        
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Table 6.2: The Model Summary 
Economic Agents Equation 
1. Households     




  Euler equation 𝐸𝑡𝛽𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1𝑅 𝑡+1 = 1  
  Labor supply 𝜚𝑡𝑊𝑡 = 𝜒𝐿𝑡
𝜑
 






   
2. Banks     
Real rate of return on private security   𝑅𝑘 𝑡+1  =
[𝑍𝑡+1+(1−𝛿)𝑄𝑡+1]
𝑄𝑡
𝜉𝑡+1    
Real rate of return on long-term 





          
Excess value of loans over deposits  𝜈1𝑡 =  𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1)    
Excess value of holding long-term 
government securitis over deposits 
𝜈2𝑡 =  𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡 𝑡+1(𝑅𝑏𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝑡+1)     
  Leverage  𝜙𝑡 =  
𝑡
𝜆−𝜈1 𝑡
       
Net worth evolution     𝑁𝑡  = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 + 𝑁𝑛𝑡  
Net worth of existing bankers    𝑁𝑒𝑡  = [(𝑅𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡)
𝑄𝑡−1𝑆𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
+ (𝑅𝑏𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡)
𝑞𝑡−1𝐵𝑡−1
𝑁𝑡−1
+ 𝑅𝑡]𝑁𝑡−1  
Net worth of new bankers    𝑁𝑛𝑡  = 𝜔𝑄𝑡𝑆𝑡−1    
3.Intermediate Good Producing Firms  
 Production function  𝑌𝑚𝑡  = 𝐴𝑡(𝑍𝑡𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡)
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼  
  Labor demand 𝑃𝑚𝑡(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑚𝑡
𝐿𝑡
 = 𝑊𝑡  
  Capacity utilization 𝑃𝑚𝑡𝛼
𝑌𝑚𝑡
𝑍𝑡
 = 𝛿′(𝑍𝑡)𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 = b𝑍𝑡 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡    






  Return on capital  







4. Capital-Producing Firms      
  Net investment 𝐼𝑛𝑡 ≡ 𝐼𝑡 − 𝛿(𝑍𝑡) 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 








′   






 −  1)2  
Capital accumulation  𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝜉𝑡𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡    
5. Retail Firms   
  Final goods production  𝑌𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑌𝑚𝑡  
Price dispersion  
𝐷𝑡 =  𝛾𝐷𝑡−1𝛱𝑡−1









Inflation dynamics  𝛱𝑡
1− =  𝛾𝛱𝑡−1
𝛾𝑝(1− ) + (1 − 𝛾)(𝛱𝑡
∗) 1−   
6. Monetary and Credit Policy   





𝑖)    
Credit policy for private securities  𝑆𝑔𝑡 =  𝜛𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑡 
Credit policy for long-term 
government securities 
𝐵𝑔𝑡 =  𝜛𝑏𝑡𝐵𝑡     
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Economic Agents Equation 
7. Household Asset Segmentation   
Demand for private securities  𝑆ℎ𝑡 = 𝑆ℎ + 
𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1(𝑅𝑘𝑡+1−𝑅𝑡+1)   
𝜅
  
Demand for long-term 
government securities   
𝐵ℎ𝑡  = 𝐵ℎ + 
𝐸𝑡𝛬𝑡,𝑡+1(𝑅𝑏𝑡+1−𝑅𝑡+1)   
𝜅
    
8. Other Equations    
Economy resource constraint 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡  + 𝛯( 
𝐼𝑡
𝐼𝑡−1
 ) 𝐼𝑡  + G + 𝜏𝑠𝑄𝑡−1𝑆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑏𝑞𝑡−1𝐵𝑔𝑡−1    
Fisher equation  1 + 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡+1
𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
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Chapter 7.  The Complementarity between Conventional and Unconventional 
Monetary Policy    
 
7.1 The Model  
 
7.1.1 Overview   
 
We investigate the connection between conventional and unconventional monetary policy in Korea. 
Since the Great Recession occurred in the late 2008, many Central Banks in small open emerging 
economies have not been able to lower their policy rates to the zero lower bound because they were 
restricted by issues such as the risk of capital outflow and risks to domestic financial stability 
occurring from soaring household credit. However, with the continuation of the economic recession 
for a long time, the issue of whether it is possible to conduct non-traditional monetary policy such as a 
large scale asset purchase alongside conventional monetary policy has started to become more 
prominent in many emerging economies even where such nominal policy rate has remained above the 
zero lower bound.  
 
Against this backdrop, in this chapter, we try to find whether unconventional monetary policy like 
large scale asset purchase can be conducted alongside conventional monetary policy like adjustment 
of short-term policy rate in Korea. To do this, we employ the model of Ellison and Tischbirek (2013). 
Ellison and Tischbirek extend canonical New-Keynesian DSGE model including a stylized financial 
sector and asset purchase by the Central Bank in the context of preferred habitat theory. They find that 
proper mixture of conventional and unconventional monetary policy can contribute to stabilize 
inflation and output more effectively.   
 
The model used in this chapter is different from the models used in the previous chapters in terms of a 
few characteristics. In this model, perfect competition in the banking sector is supposed. Hence, 
financial frictions are not introduced. Firms do not borrow funds from banks. Furthermore, 
households do not make deposits in banks and purchase assets. In addition, capital is not considered.  
           
In the model, economy is composed of four agents such as households, firms, banks, and the Central 
Bank (or a treasury). Price rigidity is also incorporated but it is postulated that wages are fully flexible.  
 
 
7.1.2 Households     
 
The household utility is separable in consumption and labor. It is described as  
 













]   
(7.1) 
  
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1 and 𝛿, 𝜑 > 0. 𝐶𝑡 represents household consumption. 𝐿𝑡  is the number of hours 
worked. 𝜇𝑡
𝐶  and 𝜇𝑡
𝐿 denote exogenous preference shocks which follow an AR(1) process.    
 
Households’ consumption is a consumption index defined below. Households choose the composition 
of consumption in order to minimize their cost. 𝑡  denotes time-varying constant elasticity of 
substitution.   







𝑡−1      
(7.2) 
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It is assumed that time-varying substitution elasticity between products follows an AR(1) process.  
 
𝑙 𝑛 ( 𝑡) = 𝜌 𝑙 𝑛 ( 𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑡  , 𝑢𝑡 ~N(0, 𝜎
2)   (7.3) 
The household budget constraint is  
𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑡,𝑡+1 + 𝑇𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 +  𝑆𝑡,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝑡𝑑)(𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡 − 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡) (7.4) 
 
where 𝑊𝑡  denotes nominal wage, 𝑇𝑡  are lump sum taxes paid to government, 𝑆𝑡,𝑡+1  denotes 
quantity of a savings instrument, 𝑃𝑡
𝑆 is unit price of the savings instrument issued by the commercial 






1− 𝑡  ) represents the price of composite 
consumption good. 𝑡𝑑 represents tax rate for dividend income, which is given by 𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡 − 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡.  































7.1.3 Banks     
 
Banks are competitive. The representative bank takes nominal deposits from households and issues 
the savings instrument. It is assumed that the bank determines maturity composition of aggregate 
savings instrument. To be concrete, the bank determines the amount of deposits which are invested 
into short- or long-term government bonds, respectively. In this model, following the tradition of the 
preferred habitat model19, it is postulated that investors have unique preference for each specific asset 
with maturities satisfying their preferred investment horizon. Households regard financial assets with 
different maturities as imperfect substitutes. Meanwhile, financial structure of banks in this model 
differs from the banks analyzed in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 since banks have zero net worth due to 
perfect competition.    
 
Banks act as financial intermediaries. They purchase short- and long-term government debt and offer 
a savings instrument to households. This savings instrument combines the features of short- and long- 
term debt into a composite asset designed for matching the bank’s perception for investment horizon 
preferred by households. Hence, allocation problem which representative bank face can be expressed 
as 
 






 )  (7.7) 
𝐵𝑡,𝑡+1, 𝑄𝑡,𝑡+𝜏  
 
subject to the flow budget constraint of the bank     
 
 
19 Vayanos and Vila (2009)   
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𝑃𝑡
𝑆𝑆𝑡 𝑡+1  = 𝑃𝑡
𝐵𝐵𝑡 𝑡+1 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑄𝑄𝑡 𝑡+𝜏  (7.8) 
where 𝑆𝑡 𝑡+1 is the quantity of savings assets created by banks, 𝐵𝑡 𝑡+1 denotes the quantity of short-
term government securities, and 𝑄𝑡 𝑡+𝜏 represents the long-term government securities. 𝑃𝑡
𝑆 is the 
relative price of savings instrument, 𝑃𝑡
𝐵  denotes the relative price of short-term government 
securities, and 𝑃𝑡
𝑄
 represents the relative price of long-term government securities.    
 
In order to derive an asset demand schedule, the Generalized Translog (GTL)20 model is used. This 
approach is used because it is flexible and gives an analytical solution. However, it is not based on 
household’s utility function.    
 
 
With the Trans-log, the log of the indirect utility function is expressed as     
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑡









)𝑚   
 




















)𝑛𝑚   
(7.9) 
 
where m, n ∈ {𝐵, 𝑄}, 𝛼2
𝑚𝑛=𝛼2
𝑛𝑚, and 𝑠𝑡 =
𝑆𝑡,𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
. Using Roy’s identity, the share of short-term 
government securities is 𝛾𝐵 ≡  
𝑃𝐵𝐵
𝑃𝑆𝑆















































Following Ellison and Tischbirek (2013), we assume that asset demands increase linearly with income. 
This implies 𝛼1 ≡ 𝛼1
𝐵  and 𝛼2 ≡ 𝛼2
𝐵𝐵 . The demands for short-term or long-term government 





































20 Pollak and Wales (1980)   
21 Barnett and Serletis (2008)   
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Assuming that cross-price effects are small, so 𝛼2 is close to zero, the financial asset demand 













− 𝛺𝐵]       
(7.13) 
 
To obtain the price of one-period securities, we note that nominal short-term interest rate paid on one-
period security is   
















































 denotes per period interest rate corresponding to the price of long-term government 
security (𝑃𝑡
𝑄
).      
 
 
7.1.4 Firms       
There exist many intermediate goods producing firms operating under perfect competition. 
Intermediate goods producing firms produce output (𝑌𝑚𝑡) using labor as the only input. In each 
period, a proportion (1 − ) of intermediate goods producing firms can adjust the price of their goods. 
Then, the production technology is assumed to be     
𝑌𝑚𝑡  = 𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡
1
𝜓         
(7.16) 
where 𝐴𝑡 denotes total factor productivity and 𝜓𝑡 is inverse of returns to scale in production.     
 
All firms which alter their prices in period t select new price of their goods, 𝑃𝑡(𝑖). Hence, the 
optimization problem of such a firm is      
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥   𝐸𝑡 ∑
𝑇−𝑡Λ𝑡,𝑇[
∞
𝑇=𝑡 𝑃𝑡(𝑖)𝑌𝑇(𝑖) − 𝑊𝑇𝐿𝑇(𝑖)]   
      𝑃𝑡(𝑖)   
(7.17) 
  















.    
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]    
(7.19) 































] = 0  
(7.20) 
Applying the real wage equation (7.5) and definition of stochastic discount factor, following equation 
can be obtained.        
  
































𝑇=𝑡 ]    
(7.21) 
 
Defining   
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(7.22) 
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(7.23) 
 









𝑡(𝜓−1)+1   
(7.24) 
 






















This price level is     
𝑃𝑡
1− 𝑡 = (𝑃𝑡−1)
1− 𝑡  + (1 − )(𝑃𝑡
∗) 1− 𝑡 (7.27) 
 











   
(7.28) 
 










𝑡(𝜓−1)+1   
(7.29) 
- 165 - 
 
7.1.5 Monetary and Fiscal Policy         
 
It is postulated the policy rate is adjusted following a Taylor rule and asset purchase is conducted 
based on a Taylor-type asset purchase rule. The government issues short- and long-term government 
securities and collects lump-sum taxes for government spending.    
 
(Monetary Policy)     
 
Monetary policy objective is to stabilize inflation and output. The Central Bank alters the risk-free 
nominal rate (𝑖𝑡) with a standard Taylor rule. Variables with no time identifier represent steady-state 











𝑖    (7.30) 
 
where 𝑖𝑡 is the risk-free nominal rate. 𝜅𝜋 denotes the policy reaction to inflation and 𝜅𝑦 denotes 
the policy reaction to output gap. 𝑢𝑡
𝑖  is an interest rate shock having an AR(1) process.     
 
It is also postulated that the Central Bank conducts an asset purchase policy following the simple asset 
















   
(7.31) 
where 𝑄  represents the long-term government securities and 𝑄𝑡,𝑡+𝜏
𝐶𝐵  denotes the long-term 
government securities which the Central Bank purchases. 𝜅𝜋
𝐴𝑃 represents the policy reaction to 
inflation and 𝜅y
𝐴𝑃 is the policy reaction to output gap. 𝑢𝑡
𝜉
 is a large scale asset purchase shock, 
which follows an AR(1) process.    
 
Equation (7.31) explains that 𝛱𝑡= 𝛱 and 𝑌𝑡= 𝑌 in steady-state. In this case, the right hand side is 
equivalent to 1, so the left hand side is also 1. This implies the Central Bank purchases no securities in 
steady state. Meanwhile, in a boom where 𝛱𝑡 >  𝛱 and 𝑌𝑡 >  𝑌, the right side equation is greater 
than 1. Thus, the left side equation is also larger than 1. This suggests that 𝑄𝑡,𝑡+𝜏
𝐶𝐵  < 0 and the Central 
Bank sells the securities. In contrast, in a slump where 𝛱𝑡 <  𝛱 and 𝑌𝑡 <  𝑌, the right side is 
smaller than 1. Therefore, the left side is also smaller than 1. This demonstrates that 𝑄𝑡,𝑡+𝜏
𝐶𝐵  > 0 and 
the Central Bank purchases securities.     
 
With regard to issuance of government securities, it is assumed that the fiscal authority issues both of 
short- and long- term government securities. Such quantity of issued short-term government debt is 
determined to be consistent with the nominal policy rate. Meanwhile, for the long-term government 




= 𝑔𝑌   (7.32) 
 
where 𝑔 > 0 and Y denotes output in the steady state. The amount of the issued real long-term 
government securities in each period is set by government.   
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(Fiscal Policy)     
 
Government finances its spending by collecting lump-sum taxes. Government spending evolves 








𝐺    (7.33) 
where G denotes the government spending value in the steady state (𝑇𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡).        
 
 
7.1.6 Resource Constraints      
 
Economy wide resource constraint is    
  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 +  𝐺𝑡     (7.34) 
Furthermore, aggregate supply of long-term government securities is same with the market demand 
for long-term government securities from banks and the Central bank.     
 
𝑄 = 𝑄𝑡,𝑡+𝜏  +  𝑄𝑡,𝑡+𝜏
𝐶𝐵      (7.35) 
 
 
7.2 Empirical Results           
 
7.2.1 Calibration  
 
With respect to setting up parameter values in this model, some parameters are calibrated referring to 
relevant literature. Average values of time-series statistics are used in calibrating some other 
parameters.     
 
First, for the value of discount factor, the estimated value of Yie and Yoo (2011) is used. In addition, 
the horizon of long-term government security is set as 20 quarters reflecting that a 5-year government 
bond is generally considered as a typical long-term security in the financial market in Korea. 
 
Next, asset values of short- and long-term government securities in steady-state are determined 
considering annualized interest rates of 3-month Monetary Stabilization Bonds and 10-year 
government bonds in Korea. For the asset demand equation, the parameters of 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛺
𝐵, and 𝛺𝑄 
are decided following Chen et al. (2012) which argues that considerable literatures estimate a 3-15 bp 
decline in yields of the long-term government securities per the large scale asset purchase worth 100 
billion.    
 
For other parameters in the exogenous shocks, the values of Ellison and Tischbirek (2013) are 
extensively used. Furthermore, when it comes to the coefficients of simple standard Taylor rule, 
coefficients are optimally chosen to minimize the Central Bank loss function in terms of optimal 
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Table 7.1: Calibrated Parameters 
Parameters Description Value Parameters Description    Value 
𝛽 Discount factor  0.988 𝑡𝑝 
Share of firm profits  
from government      
0.5 
𝛿 
Inverse elasticity of  
intertemporal substitution  
in consumption  
2.0 𝑔 
Parameter in the long-term 
government security supply rule  
0.66 
𝜑 
Inverse Frisch elasticity  
in labor supply   
0.5 𝛼1 




Intra-temporal elasticity of 
substitution in the steady-
state  
6.0 𝛼222 




Inverse of returns to scale 
in production  
1.1 𝛺𝐵 
Subsistence level of  
short-term government security  
in asset demand equation  
10.21 
 
Probability of   
keeping prices fixed    
0.85 𝛺𝑄 
Subsistence level of  
long-term government security  
in asset demand equation    
0.59 
 𝛱 Inflation in the steady-state  1.003 𝑃𝐵 
Price of short-term government 
security in the steady-state   
0.9765 
𝜏 
Horizon of long-term 
government security  
20 𝑃𝑄 
Price of long-term government 






in the steady state  
0.4    
 
< Parameters in exogenous shocks >   
 
Persistence Standard Deviation 
𝜌𝜈 Interest rate shock   0.1 𝜎𝜈 Interest rate shock   0.0025 
𝜌𝜉 Asset purchase shock   0.1 𝜎𝜉 Asset purchase shock   0.0025 
𝜌𝐶  
Consumption preference  
shock   
0.1 𝜎𝐶 
Consumption preference  
shock   
0.0025 
𝜌𝐿 
Labor supply preference  
shock   
0.7 𝜎𝐿 
Labor supply preference  




shock   
0.1 𝜎𝐺 
Government spending 
shock   
0.005 
𝜌𝐴 Technology shock 0.7 𝜎𝐴 Technology shock 0.01 





22 Since the logarithmic part in the asset demand equation is not necessary if suggested model is solved by the 
first order approximation, value of 𝛼2 which is the logarithmic part is set to zero in the model.   
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7.2.2 Experiment    
 
The Central Bank loss function is postulated as  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑤𝛱𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛱𝑡 − 𝛱) + 𝑤𝑌𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌) + 𝑤𝑖𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖) + 𝑤𝑄𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑖𝑡
𝑄
− 𝑖𝑄) (7.36) 
where 𝑤𝛱, 𝑤𝑌, 𝑤𝑖, and 𝑤𝑄 denote the relative weights for fluctuations of inflation, output, short- 
and long-term government security rate, respectively.    
 
Monetary policy objective is to minimize the Central Bank loss in equation (7.36) which is equal to 
weighted sum of fluctuations of inflation, output, short-term rate, and long-term government security 
rate.    
 
 
(Optimal Monetary Policy under No Interest Rate Stabilization)    
 
In the first policy experiment, it is supposed the Central Bank is indifferent to stabilizing fluctuations 
of short- and long-term government security rate. Reflecting such assumption, the relative weights of 
short and long-term government bond interest rate (𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑄) are set to zero in the loss function.  
 
Table (7.2) shows how the loss of Central Bank can be different depending on the coefficients in the 
policy rules of the Central Bank. In the first scenario, it is postulated the Central Bank utilizes only 
the short-term policy rate representing conventional monetary policy instrument but not 
unconventional monetary policy. The coefficients in the Taylor rule for short-term policy rate are 
chosen optimally to minimize given loss function. In the second scenario, it is postulated the Central 
Bank can use conventional and unconventional monetary policy instruments simultaneously. In this 
instance, coefficients in short-term policy rate rule are the same as the optimal coefficients in the first 
scenario. On the other hand, the coefficients in large scale asset purchase rule are selected optimally. 
Finally, in the third scenario, it is supposed the policy rate responds only to inflation fluctuations and 
large scale asset purchases respond only to output fluctuations. Hence, only the coefficient for 
inflation in policy rate rule and the coefficient for output in large scale asset purchase rule are chosen 
optimally. In other words, coefficient for output in policy rate rule and coefficient for inflation in asset 
purchase rule are fixed to zero for allocating conventional monetary policy to respond just to inflation 
and unconventional monetary policy to react just to output.     
 
According to the results of these policy experiments, the optimal policy combination of short-term 
rate adjustment and large scale asset purchase seems to be that short-term policy rate is adjusted only 
responding to inflation fluctuation and large scale asset purchase is conducted only reacting to output 
fluctuations. Against this backdrop, it appears adjustment of short-term policy rate is more effective in 
stabilizing the volatility of inflation while large scale asset purchases are more successful in 
stabilizing output volatility. In this case, the loss is much lower.  
 
However, it also proves that conducting conventional and unconventional monetary policy together is 
not an optimal policy mix when the Central Bank gives a huge weight to stabilizing volatility of 
inflation (𝑤𝛱=0.9). In other words, this can be interpreted that during some period such as a boom 
when the Central Bank more concentrates on inflation stabilization, conducting unconventional 
monetary policy such as asset purchase together with conventional policy may not be helpful in 
achieving the maximized social welfare.  
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This finding reflects individual impact of conventional or unconventional monetary policy on output 
and inflation can be different in that transmission channels of the two policies are different. Therefore, 
the influence of one conventional monetary policy like adjustment of short-term interest rate is not 
perfectly cancelled out by another unconventional monetary policy like large scale asset purchase.          
 
From this perspective, in short, a conventional monetary policy instrument such as the short-term 
policy rate can be utilized harmoniously as a complement to unconventional monetary policy tool like 
an asset purchase even though the policy rate is above zero lower bound (ZLB).        
 
Table 7.2: Optimal Monetary Policy under No Interest Rate Stabilization23 
 
Relative Weights24 
in Loss Function 






in Taylor Rule 
for Policy Rate 
 (𝜅𝜋, 𝜅𝑦) 
 
Coefficients 
in Taylor Rule  


























 1 1.85, 4.62 0.00, 0.00 1.744 0.885 1.315 - - 
0.5, 0.5, 0, 0 2 1.85(f), 4.62(f) 0.00, 0.00 1.746 0.884 1.315 -0.008 - 
 3 2.22, 0.00 0.00, 19.8  1.871 0.525 1.198 8.856 0.613 
 1 2.46, 4.10 0.00, 0.00 1.351 1.498 1.395 - - 
0.7, 0.3, 0, 0 2 2.46(f), 4.10(f) 0.09, -0.05 1.346 1.503 1.393 0.115 - 
 3 1.99, 0.00 0.00, 15.2  1.507 0.975 1.347 3.424 0.332 
 1 2.30, 3.54 0.00, 0.00 1.241 2.143 1.322 - - 
0.9, 0.1, 0, 0 2 2.30(f), 3.54(f) 0.00, 0.00 1.230 2.159 1.323 -0.092 - 




23 Coefficients in Taylor rule for policy rate and coefficients in Taylor rule for large scale asset purchase are 
optimally chosen according to the optimal simple rule using osr command in dynare. On the other hand, 
coefficients (f) are artificially fixed regardless of optimal monetary policy.      
24 These represent relative weights for each fluctuation term such as inflation, output, short- and long-term 
interest rate of government security.     
- 170 - 
 
(Optimal Monetary Policy under Interest Rate Stabilization)   
 
As a next policy experiment, it is supposed the Central Bank is also concerned with fluctuations of 
short- or long-term rate. According to the table (7.3), the Central Bank can be more effective in 
minimizing the loss when using large scale asset purchase together with adjustment of short term 
policy rate. It is shown the loss can be sharply reduced when large scale asset purchase is 
complementarily and harmoniously conducted with short term policy rate because large scale asset 
purchase is more effective in directly reducing volatility of long term interest rate in the bonds market 
including long term government securities than adjustment of short term policy rate. However, when 
all the four coefficients in the Taylor rules for policy rate and asset purchase are chosen optimally in 
scenario 4, the loss increases rather than in scenario 3 on the whole. From this aspect, it seems that 
concentration of each policy instrument on inflation or output is needed to minimize the Central 
Bank’s loss if two monetary policy instruments should be used in combination.      
 
 




in Loss  
Function 
(𝑤𝛱, 𝑤𝑌 , 












in Taylor Rule 
for Policy Rate 




in Taylor Rule  










































 1 2.15, 4.37 0.00, 0.00 1.54 1.14 9.97 540.00 1.379 - - 
0.6, 0.4, 2 2.15(f), 4.37(f) 0.00, 0.00 1.54 1.14 9.97 540.00 1.379 - - 
0.0, 0.0  3 2.22, 0.00 0.00, 19.7 1.86 0.53 10.36 11.83 1.330 3.554 0.363 
 4 -0.72, -2.84 5.68, 16.35 1.30 0.61 2.66 4.04 1.019 - - 
 1 1.84, 4.57 0.00, 0.00 1.73 0.90 9.22 400.00 2.231 - - 
0.6, 0.3,  2 1.84(f), 4.57(f) 9.03, 13.9 1.99 0.84 4.68 130.00 1.909 14.421 - 
0.1, 0.0 3 0.49, 0.00 0.00, 19.9 2.22 0.59 1.19 14.93 1.625 27.165 1.276 
 4 2.53, 3.49 0.64, 19.8 2.23 0.74 7.66 19.83 2.324 - - 
 1 -1.17, 7.41 0.00, 0.00 6.58 1.04 10.07 77.34 12.894 - - 
0.6, 0.2,  2 -1.17(f),7.41(f) -2.46, 0.53 7.09 1.33 13.96 56.41 11.557 10.368 - 
0.1, 0.1 3 1.10, 0.00 0.00, 19.9 2.05 0.56 3.10 10.47 2.711 78.978 5.232 






25 These represent relative weights for each fluctuation term such as inflation, output, short- and long-term 
interest rate of government security.      
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7.3 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, the relationship between conventional and unconventional monetary policy tool is 
analyzed through the approach of “preferred habitat model” of Ellison and Tischbirek (2013) 
incorporating the characteristics of New-Keynesian DSGE model.  
 
First, it turns out that conventional monetary policy tool like adjustment of policy rate can be 
harmoniously utilized as a complement with unconventional monetary policy instrument like an asset 
purchase even though the policy rate above zero lower bound, except for some extreme cases. This 
implies that asset purchase policy can be routinely conducted in many emerging market economies 
together with adjustment of traditional short-term policy rate even when the policy rate in those 
emerging market economies does not approach the zero lower bound, differently from major 
advanced economies like the U.S. or the U.K. during the Great Recession.          
 
Second, it also proves that conducting conventional and unconventional monetary policy together can 
be significantly contributed in minimizing the loss including the volatilities of short- or long-term rate. 
It is because large scale asset purchase can be more effective in reducing fluctuations of long term 
interest rate in the long term government security market than change of short term policy rate in light 
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Table 7.4: The Model Summary 
Economic Agents Equation 
1. Households      













𝑆 = 1     











2. Banks     
































Relationship between demands  
of short- and long-term government  












− 𝛺𝐵]  





















        
3. Firms  
  Production function  𝑌𝑚𝑡  = 𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡
1
𝜓  
  Final goods production  𝑌𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝑌𝑚𝑡  
Auxiliary variable (𝐹1𝑡)  𝐹1𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡
𝐶𝐶𝑡
−𝛿𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡𝛱𝑡+1
𝑡−1𝐹1𝑡+1     
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4. Monetary and Fiscal Policy   










𝑖   

















Quantity of issued long-term  
government security  
𝑄
𝑃𝑡
= 𝑔𝑌  
5. Other Equations    
Economy resource constraint 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 
Aggregate supply and demand  
of long-term government security   
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Chapter 8. Conclusions          
 
8.1 Main Findings  
 
This thesis analyzes effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy mainly using the approach of 
New-Keynesian DSGE model which incorporates financial friction. Specifically, Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium model explicitly incorporating financial intermediaries like Gertler and Karadi 
(2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2013) are broadly utilized in the whole part of this thesis. Parameters 
are usually calibrated using Korean statistics and relevant literatures. Conceptually, in this thesis, 
enlarging monetary base through large scale asset purchase (LSAP) or foreign exchange intervention 
(FXI) is defined as typical monetary policy tool used in the implementation of unconventional 
monetary policy. Furthermore, the relationship between conventional and unconventional monetary 
policy is also examined in terms of the preferred habitat approach.    
 
First, in chapter 3, applying Gertler and Karadi (2011) typed New-Keynesian DSGE model into 
Korean economy, the effectiveness of credit policy is analyzed for the two types of financial shocks. 
The two types of financial shock are negative capital quality and negative bank net worth shock. Both 
of shocks can arise under some financial distress such as Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008.      
 
According to simulation results, the credit policy intervention for the negative capital quality shock by 
the Central Bank makes the crisis less severe. Concretely, the credit intervention contributes to reduce 
the increasing of external finance premium (spread). Then, the Central Bank’s credit policy 
intervention is also helpful in moderating fluctuation of output. On the other hand, the economic 
influence on inflation seems slight because inflation dynamics does not considerably change even 
after the intervention in the credit market. In addition, it proves that during the crisis, more aggressive 
credit policy intervention by the Central Bank can be more effective than a normal liquidity provision 
as a stabilization policy in terms of the intervention intensity.   
 
Next, the credit policy intervention for negative bank net worth shock also makes the crisis less severe, 
similar to the case of negative capital quality shock. In a concrete way, the credit policy intervention 
also contributes to lower the increasing of external finance premium and is useful to moderate the 
fluctuation of output. The effect of the credit policy intervention on inflation is also trivial like the 
case of the intervention for the negative capital quality shock.  
 
Putting together, the overall simulation results suggest that credit policy intervention contributes to 
moderate economic contraction, regardless of negative capital quality shock or bank net worth shock. 
However, because such policy experiment is conducted under the strong assumption of a closed 
economy, it is inevitable that the policy simulation result in the chapter 3 has some limitations in 
terms of policy implication, considering that Korea is a typical small open economy which can be 
significantly affected both in real and financial sector by exogenous global shocks.       
 
Second, in chapter 4, it proves that for emerging market economies including features of a small open 
economy, effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy like the intervention in domestic credit or 
in foreign exchange market can be very different according to the source of shock during the crisis.  
 
Regarding to negative global interest rate shock originated in external sector, it proves that the 
intervention in foreign exchange market can be more effective than the intervention in domestic credit 
market in moderating fluctuations of output and inflation. On the other hand, for negative capital 
quality or bank net worth shock originated in the domestic economy, it turns out that the intervention 
in domestic credit market is slightly better than the intervention in foreign exchange market in terms 
of policy effectiveness. It seems that such a difference mainly depends on whether the origin of the 
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crisis is internal or external. Therefore, from a perspective of policy effectiveness, the Central Bank in 
an emerging market economy needs to conduct proper mixture of various unconventional monetary 
policy instruments considering different characteristics of shocks.  
 
Third, in chapter 5, the effectiveness of two monetary policies such as traditional interest rate 
adjustment and the foreign exchange market intervention using foreign reserve are analyzed based on 
the model by Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2016) which is the open economy version of Gertler and 
Karadi (2011).  
 
The experiments for three kinds of shocks are conducted. Those three shocks are total factor 
productivity shock, capital quality shock, and global interest rate shock. For total factor productivity 
shock, it turns out that positive technological shock contributes to boost the whole economy into a 
boom. Next, for the negative capital quality shock, it reduces effective capital and then bank net worth 
also decreases. In addition, because of appreciated real exchange rate in the external sector, export 
decreases and import increases. Meanwhile, inflation rises rapidly at first and output drops by more 
than 1% at trough. Finally, for global interest rate shock, due to the increase in global interest rate, 
real exchange rate depreciates. Then, export increases and import drops. Against this backdrop, this 
channel can be helpful in boosting net output, consumption, and import limitedly. Meanwhile, as 
inflation increases and real exchange rate depreciates, bank net worth also decreases. This sort of 
mechanism can act as a catalyst for economic recession. Hence, when these two opposite effects are 
comprehensively considered in evaluating the influence of the rise in global interest rate, it 
synthetically proves that net output decreases by about 0.5% and consumption also drops by 0.5%.     
 
Meanwhile, when it comes to policy simulation, according to the impulse response functions to 
foreign reserve policy when the Central Bank lowers its foreign reserve supply into foreign exchange 
market by 5%, it proves that the intervention using foreign reserve by the Central Bank can contribute 
to aggravate real activity through deteriorating financial intermediation to a certain degree. However, 
when these two opposite effects are considered synthetically, it seems that appropriate foreign 
exchange intervention using foreign reserve can be helpful in boosting inflation and output overall 
during the downturn. Simultaneously, it also proves that as the intensity of the intervention is stronger, 
as policy effectiveness is also bigger.  
 
Fourth, in chapter 6, theoretical differences in policy effectiveness are analyzed in term of three 
perspectives applying Gertler and Karadi (2013) typed New-Keynesian DSGE model into Korean 
economy. Such three perspectives are related to the difference of policy which are between 
purchasing private securities and long-term government securities, between under zero lower bound 
and non-zero lower bound, and between household’s assets segmentation and non-assets segmentation.   
 
Above all, according to policy simulations, it proves purchase of private securities can be more 
effective than purchase of long-term government securities when it comes to stabilizing financial 
market distress and boosting real activities such as investment and output. In other words, when it is 
postulated that intervention is conducted in the same degree, purchasing private securities including 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), corporate bonds, commercial papers, etc. can be more effective 
in boosting real activity and inflation than purchasing similar degree of long-term government 
securities during the crisis.       
 
Next, it also turns out that the policy effectiveness for large scale asset purchase can be considerably 
different according to whether the economy is curbed by zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint or not. 
The result of policy experiment demonstrates that large scale asset purchase can be more effective 
when the zero lower bound constraint is maintained for some periods than when the nominal policy 
rate can be adjusted flexibly in reaction to a large scale asset purchase shock. Specifically, if the 
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Central Bank can adjust its policy rate flexibly and immediately, for instance following standard 
Taylor rule, with implementation of large scale asset purchase, the policy effectiveness of such asset 
purchase can be offset by flexible adjustment of policy rate.   
 
Finally, the policy effectiveness of such large scale asset purchase can also become weaker when it is 
postulated that the household cannot directly hold any financial assets like long-term private securities 
and government securities. Namely, it proves that the increases in output and inflation through large 
scale asset purchase can be weakened when assuming there is no household’s assets segmentation in 
the securities market.    
 
Fifth, in chapter 7, the relationship between conventional and unconventional monetary policy is 
examined through the approach of “preferred habitat model” of Ellison and Tischbirek (2013) which 
includes characteristics of canonical New-Keynesian DSGE model. However, financial friction is not 
incorporated in this model.  
 
According to optimal monetary policy analysis, it proves that conventional monetary policy 
instrument like adjustment of short-term nominal policy rate can be harmoniously utilized as a 
complement with unconventional monetary policy like an asset purchase even though the policy rate 
is not restricted at zero lower bound, except for some extreme cases. This result argues that large scale 
asset purchase can be routinely conducted in many emerging market economies together with 
adjustment of short-term nominal policy rate even when the policy does not face zero lower bound, 
differently from major advanced economies like the U.S. or the U.K. during the Great Recession.          
 
In addition, it also turns out that conducting conventional and unconventional monetary policy 
together can be considerably contributed to minimize the loss which is composed of the volatilities of 
short- or long-term government security interest rates. It is since large scale asset purchase can be 
more efficient in moderating the fluctuations of the interest rate in the long-term government security   
market than normal adjustment of policy rate because the Central Bank can directly intervene in the 
transmission channel of interest rate.  
 
Therefore, in sum, considering all the comprehensive simulation results in chapter 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, 
such a conclusion can be derived that if Bank of Korea conducts unconventional monetary policy 
utilizing some policy instruments such as large scale asset purchase or foreign exchange intervention, 
it would be able to considerably contribute to protect the collapse of abrupt financial intermediation in 
crisis and boost real activities such as investment and output in a deflationary environment. At the 
same time, it is also evident that according to the characteristic of each exogenous shock, proper 
unconventional monetary policy instrument under each specific economic situation can be largely 
different. Hence, in terms of this stance, Bank of Korea would have to be more careful in choosing the 
non-traditional monetary policy tool when they decide to conduct unconventional monetary policy 
actively in the future downturn. Furthermore, considering complementarity of conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy, it seems to be possible the Central Banks in emerging market 
economies are able to routinely use unconventional monetary policy instrument with traditional 
adjustment of short-term policy rate in normal time, not just in crisis, although policy rate is not 
restricted to zero lower bound.   
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8.2 Further Research     
 
In this thesis, the policy effectiveness of alternative unconventional monetary policy instruments is 
reviewed theoretically in terms of DSGE framework. However, in this thesis, such an policy 
effectiveness analysis for enlarging monetary base or excess reserve of the Central bank have a 
tendency to mainly concentrate on large scale financial asset purchase program including long-term 
government bonds or private securities and foreign exchange intervention. This is because 
unconventional monetary policy has been conducted usually through large scale assets purchase in 
advanced economies (AE) such as US, EU, UK, and Japan and through the intervention in foreign 
exchange market in some small open economies such as Switzerland and Czech.   
 
However, in Korea, it is evident that there are also other alternative unconventional monetary policy 
tools which Bank of Korea can use, instead of large scale asset purchase or foreign exchange 
intervention during economic downturn. First, because the financial structure of Korea is formed 
pivoting on banking sector rather than capital markets, expanding Central Bank money through 
increasing credit claims to banks may be more effective than direct asset purchase in boosting 
aggregate demand under some specific economic recession. For instance, Long-Term Refinancing 
Operation (LTRO) and Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operation (TLTRO) by European Central 
Bank, Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) and Term Funding Scheme (TFS) by Bank of England, or 
Loan Support Program (LSP) by Bank of Japan are typical representatives of Central Bank’s lending 
policy for boosting real activity. In particular, if interest rate spread is not very huge, bank lending 
channel by expanding credit claims to banks can be operated more effectively than portfolio 
rebalancing channel by the Central Bank’s direct large scale asset purchase.  
 
Second, the Central Bank bill issued by Bank of Korea can be also widely utilized as an 
unconventional monetary policy instrument to boost real activity. Bank of Korea regularly issues the 
Central Bank bill which is called as Monetary Stabilization Bond (MSB) in order to manage 
superfluous liquidity for achieving inflation objective. In this regard, it can be regarded that Bank of 
Korea has an alternative option to increase monetary base by repurchasing Monetary Stabilization 
Bond issued without the need to newly purchase long-term government or private securities in a 
financial market directly. In light of this additional policy option of Bank of Korea, it seems that more 
research for analyzing the policy effectiveness of lending or Central Bank bill repurchase policy in 
Korea can be needed for future policy.         
 
In addition, in this thesis, many parameters are usually calibrated using statistics, steady-state values, 
and parameter values in relevant literatures. Hence, it is inevitable that there are some limitations in 
reflecting the state of Korean economy exactly in this approach. From this perspective, if parameters 
are estimated applying Bayesian methodology in future research, the explanation of the model would 
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